Risk Assessment Risk assessment

Risk Assessment Risk assessment is an essential part of the risk management process and is the ... Confirm sizing ... CWS inlet line and indication wi...

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Risk Assessment Risk assessment is an essential part of the risk management process and is the overall term covering the risk identification, analysis and risk evaluation part of the risk management process. The Risk management process involves the following steps, 1. System Definition 2. Risk Identification 3. Risk Estimation 4. Risk Evaluation 5. Risk Control 6.Risk Monitoring 7. Risk Communication As indicated in the earlier chapter the company currently manufactures oxime and in the proposed expansion it will manufacture Isopropyl ethyl thionocarbamate & Oxime/ Polymer solution ammonium & Potassium salt along with by-products. In order to study the risks envisaged by the proposed expansion activities, the following methodology was adopted. Detailed study of all manufacturing activities

7.2.1 M.S.D.S.s Brief M.S.D.S.s of all the above chemicals and other raw materials which would be used in the manufacturing processes of products are used as reference for preparation of HAZOP study. 7.3 HAZOP Study Introduction The HAZOP Study for both the products has been prepared considering all the unit operations and processes involved in the manufacturing of products. Methodology The documents pertaining to the processes such as rough P&I D made available by the client, MSDS of the substances involved, etc. were studied. Detailed discussions were held with the concerned officials of the factory.

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Based on the above, HAZOP worksheets were prepared by applying standard procedures of using guide words to generate deviations in the process parameters. Corrective actions wherever necessary were indicated and presented below as HAZOP recommendations. The complete HAZOP report is attached as annexure 7.1. Table No.7.1: HAZOP Study Recommendations Product name

Oxime

Recommen dation Number 1 2 3

4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

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Recommendations

Nitrogen padding to be given on ST 301 confirm the size of RD on VR 201 1) Internal coil PI/PM programme to be prepare. 2) Grounding& Bonding to be done on R 400 3) Interlock to be provided So that Magnesium charging from H 400 do not allow for low level of R400. Tagging to be done on NRV & PA/PI programme to be prepared. Toluene Transfer line grounding & bonding to be done. Interlock to be provided for MTA addition in R 400 for low level & high level PSV to be provide on HE 400 A/B Separate MOV to be provided on P301 A, NP charging line towards R 401/402. Proper RD size to be provided on R 401 & R 402. Proper size PSV to be provided on HE 401 A/B Proper size PSV to be provided on HE 402 A/B Proper RD size to be provided VR401 O2 monitoring system to be provided& use CP 403/404 during PF charging system. RD to be evaluate& provided on R 403. Proper size of RD to be installsS 403. Proper size of PSV to be install HE 404 A/B Confirm the size of RD & provided on VR 411 confirm the size of RD & provided on VT 402 confirm the size of RD & provided on R 405 50 NB pipeline size to be install on BP 403 to R 405 (D-80 & TXIB charging line) High Alarm to be provided on T 413 with level instrument. High Alarmto be provided on T 414 with level

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23 24 25 26 27 IPETC

instrument. Correct size of RD to be provide on ATFE 201 Correct size of RD to be provide on VR 214 A/B Provide relief device on P 210 ( crude oxime feed pump) Correct size of RD to be provided on VR 217,218,219,220.221,222 PSV to be provided on HE 207 A/B RD size to be reviewed through HEL To avoid dust accumulation in working premises, Dust collector to be provided. Continuous CS2 and O2 monitoring system to be provided and maintained. Continuous Nitrogen monitoring to be done after defined interval. Inerting of Hopper controlled by PCV and PSL meeting requirements of LNS2A to be provided SIPX to be procured in antistatic jumbo bags. Hooter to be provided on level or agitator interlock with level and charging hoper valve interlock RD size to be reviewed through HEL. Temperature to be controlled by TCV on steam supply interlocked with TIC on reactor. PVRV 40814 design at 25mbarg and it is to be connected to the scrubber system SCR-402 S403 jacket hydro testing to be done. Need to provide the hooter or alarm on DCS SOP training to be provided to the operators SOP training to be given to all concerns and recorded. Confirm check valve on MEA loading line to VR201/VR400A will qualify as by insuring it is on the PI/PM list of safety critical Instruments. Also need tag nr on P&ID Revalidation report on all vent sizes for all vessels and ancillary equipment. Confirm sizing for this scenario Conservation vent of VR201 & VR400A to be connected to condenser and condenser vent to be

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connected to scrubber SCR401. Detonation arrestor to be provided between scrubber header and vent line of VR201 & VR400A. RD size to be reviewed through HEL. PRV 41709 design at 25mbarg and it is to be connected to the scrubber system SCR-402 Scrubber to be designed by considering extreme condition of increase in vapor load. Revalidation report on all vent sizes for all vessels and ancillary equipment. Confirm sizing for this scenario from process hazard lab. Possibility of providing cooling media during decomposition to be checked To be defined PM/PI program Pressure switch to be provided on CHWS & CWS inlet line and indication with hooter to be provided. Follow SOP and PPE matrix High alarm indication and hooter to be installed Insulation for safety to be provided over transferring line Vent valve on VR-413 to be kept locked open Conservation vent need to provide on VR-411 High level indication and hooter to be provided Conservation vent to be provided over STT-503 N2 blanketing arrangement to be done over STT503

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7.4 Aerial Location of Hazardous Atmosphere (ALOHA): A Quantitative Risk Assessment based on the software ALOHA – Aerial Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres was carried out. The criteria failure scenarios considered for ALOHA depend on the type of storage whether above ground tank, drums in storage area or pressurized cylinders as well as physical state of the chemical stored and chemical properties of the chemical. ALOHA (Arial Locations of Hazards Atmosphere) is an atmospheric dispersion model used for evaluating releases of hazardous chemical vapors. ALOHA is a part of software called CAMEO (Computer Aided Management of Emergency Operation). CAMEO is one of the tools developed by EPA’s Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Office (CEPPO) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Office of Response and Restoration (NOAA), to assist front-line chemical emergency planners and responders. For the present calculation version 5.4.4 is used. CAMEO suite consists of three parts viz. 1. CAMEO: It is basically a chemical data base provided for calculations. 2. ALOHA: ALOHA allows the user to estimate the downwind dispersion of a chemical cloud based on the toxicological/physical characteristics of the released chemical, atmospheric conditions, and specific circumstances of the release. 3. MARPLOT (Mapping Applications for Response, Planning, and Local Operational Tasks): Graphical outputs include a "cloud footprint" that can be plotted on maps with MARPLOT to display the location of other facilities storing hazardous materials and vulnerable locations, such as hospitals and schools. Specific information about these locations can be extracted from CAMEO information modules to help make decisions about the degree of hazard posed.

Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGL):

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Figure No. 7.1: Description of AEGL levels THERMAL RADITION EFFECTS: A Thermal Radiation Level of Concern (LOC) is a threshold level of thermal radiation, usually the level above which a hazard may exist. 10 kW/(sq m) -- potentially lethal within 60 sec; 5 kW/(sq m) -- second-degree burns within 60 sec; and 2 kW/(sq m) -- pain within 60 sec. Below are some effects at specific thermal radiation levels for which software was run. 37.5 kw / m2 (100% lethality), 12.5 kw/m2 (1% lethality), 1.6 kw/m2 (no discomfort) The thermal radiation effects that people experience depend upon the length of time they are exposed to a specific thermal radiation level. Longer exposure durations, even at a lower thermal radiation level, can produce serious physiological effects.

OVERPRESSURE EFFECTS: A major hazard associated with any explosion is overpressure. Overpressure, also called a blast wave, refers to the sudden onset of a pressure wave after an explosion. This pressure wave is caused by the energy released in the initial explosion—the bigger the initial explosion, the more damaging the pressure wave. Blast waves can damage buildings or even knock them flat—often Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

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injuring or killing the people inside them. The sudden change in pressure can also affect pressure-sensitive organs like the ears and lungs. The damaging effects of the overpressure will be greatest near the source of the explosion and lessen as you move farther from the source. An Overpressure Level of Concern (LOC) is a threshold level of pressure from a blast wave, usually the pressure above which a hazard may exist. In vapour cloud explosion scenario, ALOHA will suggest three default LOC values. ALOHA uses three threshold values to create the default threat zones: • Red: 8.0 psi (destruction of buildings); • Orange: 3.5 psi (serious injury likely); and • Yellow: 1.0 psi (shatters glass). ALOHA software is used to estimate the risk associated with release of pressurized gases. The list of pressurized gases stored in the plant with respective quantity is listed in following table. Table No 7.2: Tank Farm Storage Details (Day Tanks)

The summary of ALOHA for different scenarios for Mono Ethyl Amine are attached in Annexure 7.2. ALOHA footprints for different hazard scenarios are presented in table 7.3. Table No 7.3: ALOHA footprints

Sr. No. 1

Day Tank no. VR-201

Service

MOC

70% Mono-Ethyl SS304L Amine 2 VR70% Mono-Ethyl SS304L 400A Amine Substance Failure Scenario Effects No. considered 70% Direct MEA / 01 Toxic area of Mono Source vapor cloud Ethyl Amine Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Diameter, mm 1600

Length, mm 2600

Capacity, kl 6.15

1500

2200

4.33

LOC AEGL-3

270 ppm

Distance (m) 1100

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AEGL-2 AEGL-1 MEA / 02

MEA / 03

Leak from hole in vertical cylindrical tank Flammable chemical escaping from tank (not burning

MEA / 04

MEA/ 05

MEA/ 06

49 ppm 7.5 ppm

2000 3700

16200 ppm = 60% LEL

136

2700 ppm = 10% LEL

383

8.0 psi

--

3.5 psi 1.0 psi

106 154

AEGL-3

270 ppm

91

AEGL-2 AEGL-1

49 ppm 7.5 ppm

226 606

16200 ppm = 60% LEL

11

2700 ppm = 10% LEL

28

Flammable area of vapor cloud

Over pressure (blast force) from vapor cloud explosion

Toxic area of vapor cloud

Flammable Area of Vapor Cloud

Overpressure (blast force) from vapor cloud explosion

8.0 psi

3.5 psi. 1.0 psi

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Recommendations A) Mono Ethyl Amine. 1. A dyke is given to Mono ethyl amine tanks for collection of leakages and spilled which are collected in basin or trench by providing appropriate slop, from where they can be disposed off scientifically. 2. Protect tanks from physical damage. 3. Store in cool, dry, well-ventilated area of non combustible construction away from heavily trafficked areas and emergency exits. 4. Post "No Smoking or Open Flames" signs in the storage or use area. There should be no sources of ignition in the storage or use area. 5. Personal Protective Equipments - Butyl rubber, PVC or polyethylene gloves. Safety goggles or safety glasses face shield. Safety shoes, safety showerand protective apron should be used. 6. A copy of MSDS to be kept near the storage area which should be easily available. 7.5 DOW Fire and Explosion Index The Dow index has been calculated for chemicals stored chemical storage area. Dow Index has been calculated based on storages of chemicals. DOW Index have been separately calculated area for PESO area, raw material godown area and Magnesium storage area. For the chemicals stored in PESO area, the DOW Index has been calculated for all the raw materials in storage considering Mono Ethyl amine as it has the lowest flash point and highest N (F) rating as per NFPA Classification. For the chemicals stored in raw material godown area, the DOW index has beencalculated for all the raw materials in storage considering p-Formaldehydeas it has the lowest flash point and highest N (F) rating as per NFPA Classification. Table No. 7.4: List of hazardous chemicals and its respective DOW F& E Index

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Sr. No

Chemical

Quantity at any given time,

Nh

Nf

Nr

Material Factor

F&EI

Degree of hazard

21

123.37

Intermediate

4

6.8

Light

Magnesium Storage Godown 2 Tones 0 1 1 14

15.4

Light

PESO Storage 1

Mono Ethyl Amine ( 24.39 Tones)

24.39 Tones

3

4

0

Raw Material Godown 2

3

p-Formaldehyde (10 Tones)

10 Tones

Magnesium metal

3

1

0

The DOW Index work sheet and the respective storages and recommendations for all storages are attached as Annexure - 7.3.

7.6 Toxicity (Monds) Index Introduction The principle and general approach used in the DOW method of hazard evaluation have been further developed by ICI Mond Division, the revised Mond Fire, Explosive and Toxicity index is a series of papers by Lewis (1979). The main developments made to the DOW Index in the Mond Index are: 1. It covers a wider range of process and storage installation 2. It covers the processing of chemicals with explosive properties 3. A calculation procedure is included to allow for the off-setting effects of good design and control and safety instrumentation 4. The procedure has been extended to cover plant layout 5. Separate indices are calculated to access the hazards of fire, internal explosion and aerial explosion. To estimate the Monds Index for raw materials in storage area following,

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All the raw materials stored in the industry premisesare tabulated and data for their N (H) levels and TLV levels are obtained. Based on their highest toxicity factor and lowest TLV level Mond’s Index was calculated for Mono ethyl Amine, p-Formaldehyde for drum storages. Similarly Sulphuric acid and Nonyl Phenol are stored in tank farms, Mond’s index was performed is performed for both of them.Detailed methodology of Toxicity Index and the toxicity index calculations are given in Annexure - 7.4. Table 7.6 explains the toxicity index and degree of hazard associated with respective raw material.

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Table No. 7.5: Monds Toxicity index of toxic chemicals Sr. No 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

Raw Materials

Quantity

Toluene Escaid - D80 Solvent- TXIB Methanol LDO HSD Mono Ethyl Amine Para Formaldehyde (96%) Hydroxylamine Sulphate (98%) Sodium Carbonate (98%) Magnesium oxide (80%) Caustic Lye (20%) Sodium Isopropyl Xanthate (SIPX) Nickel Sulfate HexaHydrate Magnesium Metal Sulphuric acid (Tank Storage) Nonyl Phenol (Tank Storage)

6 Tones 1 Ton 10Tones 1 Ton 4.0 Tones 1.0 Ton 1.39 Tones 10 Tones 10 Tones

Flash UN Point Classification 4.40C Class 3 0 75 C Class 4 0 136 C Not regulated 0 11 C Class 3 0 66 C Class 4 0 32 C Class 4 0 < 17.9 C Class 3 0 71 C Class 4.1 N.A Class 8

Health Hazard 2 1 -1 0 0 3 3 3

Threshold Limit Value 200 ppm 165 ppm NA 200 ppm N.A N.A 10 ppm 5 ppm Not Listed

Flammability/ Reactivity Flammable/Toxic Combustible/Toxic -Flammable Combustible Combustible Flammable / Toxic Combustible/Toxic Corrosive/Toxic

5 Tones 1 Ton 1000 liters 1 IBC 2679 kg

N.A N.A N.A. N.A

Not regulated Not regulated Class 8 Class 4.2

2 1 2 2

Not Listed --10 ppm

Toxic -Corrosive/Toxic Combustible/ Toxic

76 kg

N.A.

Not regulated

2

--

Toxic

10 Tones 13 KL

N.A. N.A

Class 4.2 Class 8

1 3

-0.25 ppm

Combustible Corrosive

141 KL

1410C

Class 8

3

5 ppm

Corrosive

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Table no. 7.6 : Calculated Mond’s Index and degree of Hazard for Hazardous chemicals. Sr. No. 1. 2. 3. 4.

Raw Materials p-Formaldehyde Mono Ethyl Amine Sulphuric acid Nonyl Phenol

Th (Toxicity factor) 250 250

Ts ( Correction factor) 125 75

Mond’s Index

Degree of hazard

7.12 6.535

Moderate Moderate

250 250

125 125

7.25 8.625

Moderate Moderate

Toxicity (Mond) Index recommendations: 1. Toxic material should be stored in cool place. It should be away from heat and temperature. 2. Toxic material can cause breathing difficulty therefore storage area should be well ventilated. 3. Dyke or Spill kit should be provided for storage to limit the spill of materials. Suitable Absorbent like sodium bi carbonate should be used to absorb the spill. 4. The storage area should not be congested and good housekeeping practice should be implemented. 5.

The chemicals should be stored considering their compatibility with each other.

6. PPE’s should be used wherever necessary.

7.7 DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN Objectives of Disaster Management Plan [DMP] The Disaster Management Plan (DMP) is aimed to ensure safety of life, protection of environment, protection of installation, restoration of production and salvage operations in the same order of priorities. For effective implementation of the DMP, it should be widely circulated and personnel training through rehearsals/drills should be organized. Further, the management should be able to demonstrate that its assessment of the consequences as good supporting evidence. To tackle the consequences of a major emergency inside the factory or immediate vicinity of the factory, a DMP has to be formulated and this planned emergency document is called "Disaster Management Plan". The objective of the Industrial Disaster Management Plan is

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to make use of the combined resources of the plant and the outside services to achieve the following: •

Effect the rescue and medical treatment of causalities



Safeguard other people



Minimize damage to property and the environment



Initially control and ultimately bring the incident under control



Identify any casualties



Provide authoritative information to the news media



Secure the safe rehabilitation of affected area



Preserve relevant records and equipment for the subsequent inquiry into the cause and circumstances of the emergency. In effect, it is to optimize operational efficiency to rescue rehabilitation and render medical help and to restore normalcy.

7.7.1 Onsite Emergency Plan Salient Features of the Project and key personnel in formation and implementation of onsite emergency plan is listed in table 7.7. Table No. 7.7: Salient Features of Project Name of Project Address (Plant) Nature of the Project Capacity Man Power Name of Vice President Key Persons in the Emergency Plan

M/s Cytec India Specialty Chemicals & Materials Pvt. Ltd. Plot No – G-54, Butibori MIDC, Dist- Nagpur State – Maharashtra. India. Specialty Chemicals Products – 555 MT/M By Products – 1323.5 MT/M 100 Nos Mr. Arun Bharadi Designation-Site Manager Mr. Sachin Devadhe Designation - ( Health, Safety and Environment Manager) Mr. Ajay Raut Designation- ( HSE Co-ordinator) Hemant Kalbande Designation-( HSE Co-ordinator) Sheetal Gotekar Designation- ( HSE Co-ordinator)

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7.7.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE PLAN On-Site emergency preparedness plan has the following objectives: 1. Safeguard lives and property at site and in its vicinity area. 2. Contain the incident and bring it under control; 3. Minimize damage to lives, property and environment; 4. Rescue and treat affected human beings; 5. To train the people to act efficiently and with confidence in an emergency. 6.

Evacuate people to safe areas;

7. To minimize its occurrence. 7.7.2.1 Pre – Emergency Plans: Pre – Emergency means the preparatory stage of the plan. It should be ensured that the prepared plan contains all required provisions and details of facility to handle and to contain the emergency situation successfully. The unit has to consider maximum and possible worst scenario for emergency purpose while planning. The unit has to develop and maintain the essential facilities, so that the emergency can be controlled and the damages are minimized in the shortest period with proper use of all available resources. The unit should be duly prepared and ready all the time to encounter any possible emergency, while it may strike or not. Being a Specialty Chemicals Manufacturing unit various type of chemicals are used possessing varied types of hazards and knowing the hazards of the chemical, stored, handled or processed in the factory, the quick response action must be created within unit. The structure of the plan may vary depending on the number of employees, materials, process, and availability of recourses, location of site, size and complexity of the unit. It should ensure to work out a plan with possibilities of various emergencies with likely to arise within unit. Further the periodical rehearsal is also to be carried out to check and examine the effectiveness, awareness and preparedness of the plan as well as services. The emergency planning is not a substitute for good design, plant operating and maintenance practices. Therefore, the Onsite Emergency Action Plan must be followed to avoid emergency. 7.7.2.2 Periodic Checking ScheduleSadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

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To check availability, work ability and take necessary actions for replacement and maintenance, if required. Check resources of water. Keep all emergency and essential Telephone Nos. with contact persons, suppliers for the same handy. Contact details may be displayed on the boards installed at prominent locations in the plant and offices. Maintain the co- ordination with other fire – services. Also the Firefighting system and PPE should be checked if they are in working condition and proper maintenance should be done. 7.7.2.3Preventive Maintenance (To Avoid Emergency) A scheduled periodical preventative maintenance and inspection of the plants, Reactors, centrifuges, equipment’s, storage tanks, air compressors, D.G. Sets etc. are as per laid down procedures and check that records are maintained properly. Check the test, examination and certification have been carried out within reasonable period. 7.7.2.4Training By imparting an effective training to the plant supervisors, inspectors, and education and training of the workers from time to time, the awareness is to be kept alive all the time to ensure safety awareness, preparedness for emergency situations, good housekeeping, discipline, etc. Display of safety slogans, operative instructions and motivation for safety should be made part of the company’s normal activities. All the persons earmarked for the emergency services are to be trained to respond to the emergency. The company conducts internal & external training for Environment Health & safety. The training should be conducted at a documented frequency. The external training should be conducted six monthly and internal training is conducted every month. 7.7.2.5 Monitoring the Environment Continuous and periodic monitoring of environment is required for detection of a possible damage or a risky situation arises. 7.7.2.6Mock Drill Organize the periodical mock drill / rehearsal as per suggested format by creating an emergency situation so as to verify preparedness and awareness as well as shortcomings on the part of the Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

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person to overcome the same. Provide sufficient time prior to mock drill to the emergency services and public for proper response to exercise and provide training also. Record the deficiencies of the system during the trial and take appropriate actions to improve the efficiency of the plan in terms of preparedness and response. 7.7.2.7 Maintenance of Records Keep the records of the monitoring conditions, safety systems, storage levels, process condition, etc. and maintain the log- books, registers etc. Keep the M.S.D.S. and onsite emergency plan with required details in a place from where they are readily available. 7.7.2.8 Emergency Control Room The equipped Emergency Control Room should be in working order. The plant layout maps, drawing, storage details, Material safety Data Sheets (MSDS), emergency operations, manuals etc. should be kept and should be updated continuously. List of essential telephone Nos. is also maintained up to date. The senior and expert person should be posted as in charge of the control room. 7.7.2.9 Command & Control The organization chart, for the emergency plan has been given which explains the chart of command, channel of information flow, and actions as required during the emergency. The single organizational structure has been created on striking emergency and the same shall be continued till the emergency over. The Shift Supervisor shall take the initial charge as incident controller; he will be coordinating with various agencies effectively to combat the situation. The security office room will be used as emergency control Room. The security gate will be used as Assembly point. The Factory Manager will act as site main controller for the unit. On arrival, he will supervise all activities with the help of asst. Plant in- charge.

7.7.2.10Identification of Hazards The type of hazards have been identified in the previous section accordingly and risk quantification is also been done for all hazardous raw materials.

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7.7.3 Fire controlling measures in case of emergency situation: In the plant premise different control measures shall be applied to control and extinguish fire in accidental situations. Following list details the availability of such measures available at different plant locations. List of fire extinguishers provided 1. No. of fire extinguishers – 138 no. 2. Type of extinguishers – DCP/CO2/Foam Type/D-Type/Water CO2 3. Location of Fire Extinguishers: As given below

Table No.7.8: Details of fire extinguishers with location Sr. No.

Type

1 2 3 4 5 6

DCP (2no.) DCP (2no.) DCP (2no.) CO2 (2no.) DCP (4no.) DCP (4no.)

7 8 9

DCP (1no.) CO2 (1no.) CO2 (2no.)

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

CO2 (1no.) CO2 (1no.) CO2 (1no.) CO2 (1no.) Foam (1no.) CO2 (1no.) DCP (8no.) Foam (1no.) CO2 (3no.) DCP (6no.) CO2 (2no.) DCP (6no.)

22 23

Water CO2 (3no) DCP (1no.)

Location Warehouse Dept. Old warehouse Store entrance New warehouse Store entrance Warehouse entrance East side Near Fire door Emergency Exit 1 Front & back side Emergency Exit 2 Front & back side Laboratory Lab emergency exit Retention sample room Lab ( inside) Plant Plant entrance North side (C 10) At C8 (Ground Floor) At C6(Ground Floor) At C4(Ground Floor) Near R-400 At C2(Ground Floor) At A10,8,5,3 &D 7,5,3,1(Ground Floor) Near R-400 1st floor At B 3,7,9 ( Ist Floor) At C5,7 & A7,10 & D5,8 ( 1st Floor) At A 9,6 (2nd Floor) At A5,B2 &D 6,7,8 (2nd Floor)/Near T-413 Utility Biomass area Entrance cooling tower pump

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24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36

CO2 (1no.) CO2 (2no.) DCP (1no.) CO2 (1no.) CO2 (1no.) CO2 (1no.) CO2 (1no.) CO2 (1no.) DCP (1no.) CO2 (4no.) DCP (2no.) DCP (1no.) DCP (1no.)

37 38 39 40 41

CO2 (1no.) CO2 (1no.) DCP (1no.) CO2 (1no.) CO2 (1no.)

42 43 44

Foam (1no.) DCP (4no.) DCP (1no.)

45 46 47

CO2 (1no.) CO2 (1no.) DCP (1no.)

48

CO2 (2no.)

49 50

CO2 (2no.) DCP (1no.)

51 52

DCP (2no.) D-Type (2 no.)

53 54 55 56 57

DCP (2no.) CO2 (1no.) CO2 (1no.) DCP (2no.) DCP (2no.)

58

DCP (6no.)

Nitrogen plant Compressor shed Near old Tharmopac MCC entrance MCC inside MCC inside MCC back entrance Maintaince Workshop Maintaince workshop 33 kv Substation inside Near HT room Near pilot plant Site entry from canteen Admin block Office entrance Near FM 200 Panel Ground floor passage 1st floor Entrance Conference room 1st near Electrical room Explosive Godown Expl.godown area entry Explosive godown entry Changing room entrance Pump House Inside Pump house Inside Pump house Entrance ECC room Rack room Both entrance Instrument room Both entrance Security gate 1 Magnesium godown At both entrance At both entrance Byproduct Ground floor Ground floor 1st floor 1st floor 2nd floor Hazardous Waste storage shed East & south side of HWSS

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59

7.7.4

Foam (4no.)

East & north side of HWSS

Fire Fighting Systems Table No.7.9: Details of fire fighting system

Fire Fighting Tank Details Capacity of Fire Fighting tanks 300 KL Type of tank Overhead/ Below head Underground Material of Construction RCC Pump Capacity of fire fighting tank Main pump – 273 m3/hr and head of 88 metres. No of assembly points 2 no. Gate – 2 Plant North west side No of exit points for emergency evacuation 3 no. of gates Fire Hydrant system Yes No of fire hydrant points in the premises 38 no.

7.7.4.1 Water requirement for Fire Fighting and Back – up Time Calculation. The amount of water required for firefighting purpose can be estimated by the below formula: Water required in liters per minutes = (A + B +C + D)/20 A) The total area in sq.mtr of all Floors including galleries in all building of the factory (Total Built up Area) = 8399.7 sq.m. B) The total area in sq.mtr of all Floors and galleries including open spaces in which combustible materials (Total Area wherever raw material is stored + Tank farm yard area) = 12417.81 sq.m.

C) The total area in sq.mtr of all Floors over 15 mtr above ground level = NIL sq.m. D) The total area in sq.mtr of all floors of buildings other than those of fire resisting construction of various floors is so certified by any fire association or fire insurance company = 148 sq.m.

Water required in liters per minutes = (8399.7 +12417.81 + NIL+ 148)/20 = 1048 lit/min = 1.048m3/min

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The quantity of firefighting tank is 300 m3. Time (min) = [Total water in fire fighting tank (m3)]/water required m3/min = 300/ 1.048 = 286.26 min = 286/60 = 4 Hrs. 77 Minutes. Therefore the capacity is justified. As the back-up water supply will last for 4.77 hours. 7.7.4.2 Justification considering pump capacity The pump capacity in the plant is 273m3/hr, therefore according to the discharge capacity of the pump installed. The back-up time by which the tank will be empty is calculated below, Time (min) = [Total water in fire fighting tank (m3)]/discharge capacity (m3/hr) = 300/273 = 1.098 Hours i.e 66 mins. Back-up time will be 66 mins. Table No. 7.10: Location of fire hydrant points in the premises Sr. No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

Type Canvas Canvas Canvas Canvas Canvas Canvas Canvas Canvas Canvas Canvas Canvas Canvas Canvas Canvas Canvas Canvas Canvas Canvas

Capacity 45Mtrs 45 Mtrs 45 Mtrs 45 Mtrs 45 Mtrs 45 Mtrs 45 Mtrs 45 Mtrs 45 Mtrs 45 Mtrs 45 Mtrs 45 Mtrs 45 Mtrs 45 Mtrs 45 Mtrs 45 Mtrs 45 Mtrs 45 Mtrs

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Location Near Pump House Area Near Gate No. 1 parking area North side warehouse North side fencing area North side fencing area North side fencing area North side fencing area Near explosive godown Westside charbhuja South side explosive godown In front of explosive godown Backside NP tank Back side Mg. Godown South side of Mg. Godown Near Gammon wall West side Nitrogen plant South side nitrogen plant South side Thermo pack South side MCC room Chapter 7- 21

19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38

7.7.5

Canvas Canvas Canvas Canvas Canvas Canvas Canvas Canvas Canvas Canvas Canvas Canvas Canvas Canvas Canvas Canvas Canvas Canvas Canvas Canvas

45 Mtrs 45 Mtrs 45 Mtrs 45 Mtrs 45 Mtrs 45 Mtrs 45 Mtrs 45 Mtrs 45 Mtrs 45 Mtrs 45 Mtrs 45 Mtrs 45 Mtrs 45 Mtrs 45 Mtrs 45 Mtrs 45 Mtrs 45 Mtrs 45 Mtrs 45 Mtrs

East side MCC room South side warehouse South side substation East side new canteen East side canteen toilet Near gate No. 2 South side pump house East side ware house Back side Admin Building North side MCC room South side warehouse South side warehouse South side of 4.6 Mtr plant area East side H2SO4 tank North side air compressor North side boiler area Plant First floor East side Plant Second floor North side Plant First floor South side Plant Second floor South side

Flow Diagram showing Key Persons involved in Emergency Situation and their hierarchy.

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 22

Figure No. 7.2: Schematic Representation of organizational structure of environment management

7.7.6 Emergency Responsibilities The responsibilities of the key personnel are appended below. Safety assistant •

On knowing about emergency, rushes to ECC.



Helps the Incident Controller in containment of the emergency. Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 23



Ensures fire pumps in operating conditions and instructs pump house operator to be ready for any emergency with standby arrangement.



Guides the fire fighting crew i.e. firemen, trained plant personnel and security staff.



Organizes shifting the fire fighting facilities to the emergency site, if required.



Takes guidance of the Incident Controller for firefighting as well as assesses the requirements of outside help.



Arranges to control the traffic at the gate and the incident area.



Directs the security staff to the incident site to take part in the emergency operations under his guidance and supervision.



Evacuates the people in the plant or in the nearby areas as advised by Site Controller.



Searches for casualties and arranges proper aid for them.



Assembles a search and evacuation team.



Arranges for safety equipment for the members of this team.



Decides which paths the evacuated workers should follow.



Maintains law and order in the area and, if necessary, seeks the help of police.

7.7.7 Safety Supervisor •

In the event of failure of electric supply and thereby internal telephone, sets up communication point and establishes contact with the Emergency Control Centre (ECC).



Organizes medical treatment to the injured and, if necessary, arrange to shift the injured to nearby hospitals.



Mobilizes extra medical help from outside, if necessary.



Keeps a list of qualified first aiders of the factory and seeks their assistance.



Maintains first aid and medical emergency requirements.



Makes sure that all safety equipment is made available to the emergency team.



Assists Site Controller with necessary data and to coordinate the emergency activities.



Assists Site Controller in updating the emergency plan, organizing mock drills, verification of inventory of emergency facilities and furnishing report to Site Controller.



Maintains liaison with Civil Administration.



Ensures availability of canteen facilities and maintenance of rehabilitation centre.

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 24



He will liaise with Site Controller/Incident Controller.



Ensures transportation facility.



Ensures availability of necessary cash for rescue/rehabilitation and emergency expenditure.



Controls rehabilitation of affected areas on discontinuation of emergency.



Makes available diesel/petrol for transport vehicles engaged in emergency operation.

7.7.8 Safety Manager •

He would assist Site Controller and Incident Controller.



Maintains essential services like Diesel Generator, Water, Fire Water, compressed Air/Instrument Air and power supply for lighting.



He would plan alternate facilities in the event of power failure, to maintain essential services such as lighting, refrigeration plant etc.



He would organize separate electrical connections for all utilities and emergency services so that in the event of emergency or fires, essential services and utilities are not affected.



Gives necessary instructions regarding emergency electrical supply, isolation of certain sections etc. to shift in charge and electricians.



Ensures availability of adequate quantities of protective equipment and other emergency materials, spares etc.

7.7.9 General Responsibilities of Employees during an Emergency During an emergency, it becomes more enhanced and pronounced when an emergency warning is raised; the workers, if they are in charge of process equipment, should adopt safe and emergency shut down and attend to any prescribed duty as essential employee. If no such responsibility is assigned, he should adopt a safe course to assembly point and await instructions. He should not resort to spread panic. On the other hand, he must assist emergency personnel towards objectives of DMP. 7.7.10 Emergency Facilities 7.7.10.1 Emergency Control Centre (ECC) M/s Cytec India Specialty Chemicals & Materials Pvt. Ltd.. has established an Emergency Control Centre. It has external telephone, telefax and telex facility. All the Site Controller/

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 25

Incident Controller Officers, Senior Personnel would be located here. The following information and equipment will be provided at the Emergency Control Centre (ECC): •

Intercom, telephone



P and T telephone



Safe contained breathing apparatus



Fire suit/gas tight goggles/gloves/helmets



Hand tools, wind direction/velocities indicators



Public address megaphone, hand bell, telephone directories



(Internal, P and T) factory layout, site plan



Emergency lamps/torch lights/batteries



Plan indicating locations of hazard inventories, plant control room, sources of safety equipment, work road plan, assembly points, rescue location, vulnerable zones, and escape routes



Hazard chart



Emergency shut-down procedures



Nominal roll of employees



List of key personnel, list of essential employees, list of Emergency Co-ordinators



Duties of key personnel



Addresses with telephone numbers of key personnel, emergency coordinator, and essential employees.



Important addresses and telephone numbers including Government agencies, neighboring industries and sources of help, outside experts, chemical fact sheets, population details around the factory.

7.7.10.2 Assembly Point Number of assemblies depending upon the plant location would be identified wherein employees who are not directly connected with the disaster management would be assembled for safety and rescue. Emergency breathing apparatus, minimum facilities like water etc. would be organized. In view of the size of plant, different locations are earmarked as assembly points. Depending upon the location of hazard, the assembly points are to be used.

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 26

7.7.10.3 Emergency Power Supply Plant facilities would be connected to Generator and would be placed in auto mode. Thus, water pumps, plant’s lighting and emergency control centre, administrative building and other auxiliary services are connected to emergency power supply. In all the blocks, flameproof type emergency lamps would be provided. 7.7.10.4 Fire Fighting Facilities First Aid and Firefighting equipment suitable for emergency are maintained well in each section in the plant. This would be developed according to the statutory requirements. However, fire hydrant line covering major areas has been laid. Fire alarms have been located in the bulk storage areas. 7.7.10.5 Location of Wind Sock Windsocks exist in the plant. 7.7.10.6 Emergency Medical Facilities Stretchers, gas masks and general first aid materials for dealing with chemical burns, fire burns etc. will be maintained in the medical centre as well as in the emergency control room. Private medical practitioners’ help would be sought. Government hospital would be approached for emergency help. Apart from plant first aid facilities, external facilities would be augmented. Names of medical personnel and medical facilities in the area would be Prepared and updated. Necessary specific medicines for emergency Treatment of burns patients and for those affected by toxicity would be maintained. Breathing apparatus and other emergency medical equipment would be provided and maintained. The help of nearby industrial managements in this regard would be taken on mutual support basis.

Table No. 7.11: First Aid kit Facility Sr. No of First No Aid kits available 1

Locations where the first aid kit is Available Total 9 no. of Plant First aid kits

Components of First Aid Box

Person Responsible and designation.

1.Medium size sterilized Dressings

1.Sanjay Hejib ( Production Superintendent)

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 27

2.Sterilized Eye pad 3.Ointment for Burns 4.Diclot ointment 5.Sterilized Cotton wool 6.Cotton Bandage 2” 7.Cotton Bandage 4” 8.Triangular Bandage 9.Adhesive Plaster (2 cm X 1 meter) 10.Disposal gloves 11.Eye wash bottle 12.Breathing barrier 13.Safety Pins 14.Cold pack 15.Scissors 16.First Aid Leaflet 17.Antiseptic wipes 18.Gauge pads 19.Emergency blanket 20.Hansaplast

Laboratory Warehouse Utility area Workshop Admin Building Security gate no.1 ECC Room OHC center

2. Vikas Mahajan ( Production Engineer) Vandana Deshbhratar & Alka Waghe ( QC Leader) Uttam Biswas ( Warehouse Coordinator) Rambhau Matankar& Krishna Virkhare( Boiler operator) Devkumar Tambe ( Maintaince Supervisor) Ashish Kale ( HR Coordinator)

Umashankar Singh &Jagdishkardate( Security Incharge) Umashankar Singh &Jagdishkardate( Security Incharge) VaishaliBhagat& Satish kewarti( OHC Nurse)

Table No. 7.12: No. of sprinklers 1. No. of sprinklers- 242 no Sr. No.

Location

No. of sprinklers

1

Warehouse area

130

2

Explosive godown

112

Table No. 7.13: No. of smoke detectors 1. No. of smoke detectors- 99 no. Sr No SD-4 SD-5 SD-15 SD-16 SD-24 SD-32 SD-6 SD-7

Location

Admin Building Ground Floor Reception area

Admin building ground floor Library room Admin building ground floor Board Room

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 28

SD-8 SD-37 SD-35 SD-13 SD-12 SD-13 SD-36 SD-38 SD-39 SD-9 SD-33 SD-34 SD-1 SD-2 SD-3 SD-25 SD-26 SD-27 SD-29 SD-30 SD-31 SD-23 SD-28 SD-22 SD-52 SD-53 SD-54 SD-59 SD-62 SD-63 SD-64 SD-65 SD-58 SD-69 SD-71 SD-72 SD-61 SD-66 SD-50 SD-45 SD-46 SD-47 SD-48

Admin building ground Electrical room A.B ground floor pantry A.B Ground floor Procurement Dept. record room Procurement Dept. cubical cabin A.B ground floor Production Superintendent cabin A.B ground floor Procurement Manager cabin A.B ground floor passage LAB Passage QC manager cabin Lab Leader(cabin) R&D Manager (cabin)

LAB Room

LAB GC & HPLC room Lab passage Admin Building 1st Floor Reception area A.B First floor pantry A.B First floor round table room

A.B First floor Process/instrumentation/supply chain cubical

A.B First floor visitor cabin 1 A.B First floor visitor cabin 2 A.B First floor HR dept. cubical A.B First floor round conference room A.B First floor Project/Finance /IT cubical

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Chapter 7- 29

SD-57 SD-81 SD-40 SD-41 SD-43 SD-78 SD-76 SD-77 SD-75 SD-68 SD-80 SD-79 SD-74 SD-51 SD-52 SD-53 SD-54 SD-55 SD-56 SD-57 SD-58 SD-60 SD-61 SD-62 SD-2 SD-3 SD-4 SD-5 SD-6 SD-7 SD-14 SD-15 SD-16 SD-17 SD-18 SD-19 SD-20 SD-21 SD-22 SD-23 SD-24 SD-25 SD-31 SD-32

A.B First floor Record room Site manager cabin HSE manager cabin Instrument manager cabin Project manager cabin HR manager cabin Maintaince Manager cabin Finance manage cabin Sr. Process Engineer cabin Logistic Manager cabin A.B. First floor Visitor cabin A.B. First floor IT room A.B. First floor Electrical room

Canteen

Canteen kitchen Canteen store room Maintenance office

Substation room ( HT & LT room)

MCC room

Rack room

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Chapter 7- 30

SD-33 SD-42 SD-43 SD-44

Production/Safety/ Warehouse office

Table No. 7.14: Type and no. of protective and rescue equipment on site Sr No 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

Type

No

Location

SCBA

1 2 3 4 5 1

In front of warehouse Ground floor plant North side Ground floor plant South side Boiler area Explosive godown ECC Room

1 2 2 1 Each 1 Copy

ECC Room Warehouse ECC & Warehouse ECC Room ECC Room

5 1 7 10 no. 15 no.

Plant & warehouse Warehouse ECC & Warehouse ECC & Warehouse ECC/Warehouse/plant

2 no. 10 8 no.

ECC Room ECC & Warehouse Plant Ground floor Northside Plant Ground floor Southside Plant 4.6 Level Northside Plant 4.6 level Southside Plant 8.6 level Northside Plant 8.6 level Southside Boiler room Explosive godown G. Floor entrance south side of plant G. Floor entrance North side of plant

SCBA cylinder trolley with Bio-airline supply set Tripod winch Rope ladder Public address system Emergency Kit MSDS/Evacuation plan/Medical Emergency Response plan/OSEMP/Hydrant layout Fire proximity suit Alumina fire retardant suit Pressure suit Full face mask ( panorama) Organic vapor cartridge mask Flash light torch Richet PPE cupboard

Safety shower

SS-01 SS-02

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Chapter 7- 31

29

SS-03

30

SS-04

31

SS-05

32

SS-06

33 34 35 36 37

SS-07 SS-08 SS-09 SS-10 SS-11

38

SS-12

39

SS-13

40 41

SS-14 SS-15

42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64

SS-16 SS-17 EW-01 EW-02 EW-03 EW-04 EW-05 EW-06 EW-07 EW-08 PEW-01 PEW-02 SB-01 SB-02 SB-03 SB-04 SB-05 SB-06 SB-07 SB-08 SB-09 SB-10 SB-11

Sand Bucket

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

At 4.8m level Entrance from south side of plant At 4.8m level Entrance from North side of plant At 8.6m level Entrance from south side of plant At 8.6m level Entrance from North side of plant G. Floor East side of plant Near T-413 In front of new warehouse. In front of warehouse ( old safety shower) Near pilot plant ( old safety shower) Near Nonyl phenol (ST-301 Tank) old safety shower Near H2so4 Tank farm area ( New safety shower) Near H2so4 Tank farm area ( old safety shower) Centre of the Utility shed on the north side North west corner of the utility shed near the platform stairs At ground floor Byproduct North east corner of the old DG set G. floor plant near T-406, C-7 First floor Main plant Near S-403 North east corner of By product plant 1st floor of by product plant Inside GC/HPLC Room Inside New lab Inside New lab Lab sample room Hazardous Waste storage yard Explosive godown In Front of Warehouse area Near Cage Elevator G.F Plant Near HE-217 Near C-201 1ST Floor Near R-404 Near VR-411 2nd floor Near VR-221 2nd floor Entrance 33 KV Substation Emergency Exit of LAB Near H2SO4 Tank By product area

Chapter 7- 32

65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108

Water Monitor

Hose Reel

Hose boxes

SB-12 WM-01 WM-02 WM-03 WM-04 WM-05 WM-06 HR-01 HR-02 HR-03 HR-04 HR-05 HR-06 HR-07 HR-08 HR-09 HR-10 HR-11 HR-12 HB-01 HB-02 HB-03 HB-04 HB-05 HB-06 HB-07 HB-08 HB-09 HB-10 HB-11 HB-12 HB-13 HB-14 HB-15 HB-16 HB-17 HB-18 HB-19 HB-20 HB-21 HB-22 HB-23 HB-24 HB-25

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Explosive godown North side explosive godown South side explosive godown West side of main plant East side main plant North side of boiler area Near H2SO4 tank North side entrance of plant South side entrance of plant First floor plant north side First floor plant south side Second floor plant north side Second floor plant south side Warehouse south side Warehouse north side Admin east south corner ground floor Admin first floor East side of canteen Utility section(near D.M.plant) Near Pump House Area Near Gate No. 1 parking area North side warehouse North side fencing area North side fencing area North side fencing area North side fencing area Near explosive godown Westside charbhuja South side explosive godown In front of explosive godown Backside NP tank Back side Mg. Godown South side of Mg. Godown Near Gammon wall West side Nitrogen plant South side nitrogen plant South side Thermo pack South side MCC room East side MCC room South side warehouse South side substation East side new canteen East side canteen toilet Near gate No. 2 South side pump house Chapter 7- 33

109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151

Hose boxes

Spill KIT

Walki-talki

FM -200 SYSTEM Fire alarm system 3% Aqueous film forming foam Trolley Manual call point (MCP)

HB-26 HB-27 HB-28 HB-29 HB-30 HB-31 HB-32 HB-33 HB-34 HB-35 HB-36 HB-37 HB-38 SK-P-01 SK-P-02 SK-P-03 SK-P-04 SK-W-01 SK-U-01 SK-U-02 SK-U-03 SK-E-01 SK-L-01 SK-RS-01 3 no. 2 no. 1 no. 1 no. 3 no. 1 no. 2 no. 1 no. 1 no. 1 no.

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

East side ware house Back side Admin Building North side MCC room South side warehouse South side warehouse South side of 4.6 Mtr plant area East side H2SO4 tank North side air compressor North side boiler area Plant First floor East side Plant Second floor North side Plant First floor South side Plant Second floor South side Plant Ground floor near T-406 Plant ground floor near VR-410 Plant 1st floor near R-404 Plant 1st floor near C-201 Warehouse Utility area near Themopack Boiler area Workshop Explosive godown Lab Retention sample room Production Dept. HSE dept. QC. Dept. Instrument Dept. Maintenance& utility Site manager Security Dept. IT room Near security gate no. 1 Plant ground floor Admin B. Entrance of Emergency Exit Main Entrance of Admin B. Inside Lab Admin B.1st floor near Emergency Exit 1st floor entrance of Admin B. Canteen Entrance Inside canteen Canteen kitchen area Entrance of Maintenance room Chapter 7- 34

152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

164

22

165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193

23 24 25 26 27 28 29 P(SH)-01 P(SH)-02 P(SH)-03 P(SH)-04 U(SH)-01 U(SH)-02 U(SH)-03 U(SH)-04 U(SH)-05 U(SH)-06 U(SH)-07 U(SH)-08 C(SH)-01 C(SH)-02 C(SH)-03 C(SH)-04 L(SH)-01 P(A)-01 P(A)-02 P(A)-03 P(A)-04 P(A)-05

Safety Harness

Safety Ladder

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Workshop area Workshop area Entrance of MCC Room Near DM Water tank Near themopack area G.F south side entrance of Main plant G.F North side entrance of Main plant 1st floor North side entrance of Main plant 1st floor South side entrance of Main plant 2nd floor South side entrance of Main plant 2nd floor North side entrance of Main plant South side 1st gate main entrance of warehouse area South side 2nd gate main entrance of warehouse area Entrance of Pump house area Mg godown 1st floor passage of Admin B Inside substation area Inside substation area In warehouse 1st Emergency exit door In warehouse 2nd Emergency exit door Production

Maintaince& Utility

Civil

Lab Production

Chapter 7- 35

194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203

P(A)-06 U(A)-01 U(A)-02 U(A)-03 U(A)-04 U(A)-05 U(A)-06 U(E)-01 U(E)-02 U(E)-03

Maintenance & Utility

7.7.11 Emergency Actions 7.7.11.1 Emergency Warning Communication of emergency will be made familiar to the personnel inside the plant and people outside. An emergency warning system has already been established in the plant. 7.7.11.2 Emergency Shutdown There are a number of facilities which can be provided to help deal with hazardous conditions, when a tank is on fire. The suggested arrangements are: •

Stop feed



Dilute contents



Remove heat



Deluge with water



Transfer contents. Whether a given method is appropriate depends on the particular case.



Cessation of agitation may be the best action in some instances but not in others. Stopping of the feed may require the provision of bypass arrangements.

Methods of removing additional heat include removal through the normal cooling arrangements or use of an emergency cooling system. Cooling facilities, which use vaporizing liquid, may be particularly effective, since a large increase in vaporization can be obtained by dropping pressure.

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 36

7.7.11.3 Evacuation of Personnel There could be more number of persons in the storage area and other areas in the vicinity. The area would have adequate number of exits and staircases. In the event of an emergency, unconnected personnel have to escape to assembly point. Operators have to take emergency shutdown procedure and escape. Time Office maintains a copy of deployment of employees in each shift. If necessary, persons can be evacuated by rescue teams. 7.7.11.4 All Clear Signal Also, at the end of an emergency, after discussing with Incident Controllers and Emergency Cocoordinators, the Site Controller orders an all clear signal. When it becomes essential, the Site Controller communicates to the District Emergency Authority, Police, and Fire Service personnel regarding help required or development of the situation into an Off-Site Emergency.

7.7.12 General parameters 7.7.12.1Employee Information During an emergency, employees would be warned by raising siren in specific pattern. Employees would be given training of escape routes, taking shelter, protecting from toxic effects. Employees would be provided with information related to fire hazards, antidotes and first aid measures. Those who would be designated as key personnel and essential employees should be given training in emergency response. 7.7.12.2 Public Information and Warning The industrial disaster effects related to this plant may mostly be confined to the plant area. The detailed risk analysis has indicated that the pool fire effects would not be felt outside. However, as an abundant precaution, the information related to chemicals in use would be furnished to District Emergency Authority (normally the Collector) for necessary dissemination to general public and for any use during an offsite emergency. 7.7.12.3 Co-ordination with Local Authorities Keeping in view the nature of the emergency, two levels of co-ordination are proposed. In the case of an On Site Emergency, resources within the organization would be mobilized and in the event of an extreme emergency, local authorities’ help should be sought. Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 37

In the event of an emergency developing into an offsite emergency, local authority and District Emergency Authority (normally the Collector) would be appraised and under his supervision, the Off Site Disaster Management Plan would be exercised. For this purpose, the facilities that are available locally, i.e. medical, transport, personnel, rescue accommodation, voluntary organizations etc. would be mustered. Necessary rehearsals and training in the form of mock drills should be organized.

7.8 Off-Site Emergency Preparedness Plan The off-site plan will be prepared with the help of the local district authorities. The proposed plan will be based on the following guidelines. 7.8.1 Introduction Off-site emergency plan follows the on-site emergency plan. When the consequences of an emergency situation go beyond the plant boundaries, it becomes an off-site emergency. Off-site emergency is essentially the responsibility of the public administration. However, the factory management will provide the public administration with the technical information relating to the nature, quantum and probable consequences on the neighboring population. The off-site plan in detail will be based on those events, which are most likely to occur, but other less likely events, which have severe consequence, will also be considered. Incidents, which have very severe consequences yet have a small probability of occurrence, should also be considered during the preparation of the plan. However, the key feature of a good off-site emergency plan is flexibility in its application to emergencies other than those specifically included in the formation of the plan. The roles of the various parties who will be involved in the implementation of an off-site plan are described below. Depending on local arrangements, the responsibility for the off-site plan should either rest with the works management or, with the local authority. Either way, the plan should identify an emergency coordinating officer, who would take the overall command of the off-site activities. As with the on-site plan, an emergency control centre should be set up within which the emergency coordinating officer can operate. An early decision will be required in many cases on the advice to be given to people living "within range" of the accident; in

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 38

particular, whether they should be evacuated or told to go indoor. In the latter case, the decision can regularly be reviewed in the event of an escalation of the incident. Consideration of evacuation may include the following factors: •

In the case of a major fire but without explosion risk (e.g. an oil storage tank), only houses close to the fire are likely to need evacuation, although a severe smoke hazard may require this to be reviewed periodically



If a fire is escalating and in turn threatening a store of hazardous material, it might be necessary to evacuate people nearby, but only if there is time; if insufficient time exists, people should be advised to stay indoors and shield themselves from the fire For release or potential release of toxic materials, limited evacuation may be appropriate downwind if there is time. The decision would depend partly on the type of housing "at risk". Conventional housing of solid construction with windows closed offers substantial protection from the effects of a toxic cloud, while shanty house, which can exist close to factories, offers little or no protection

7.8.2 Aspects Proposed to be considered in the Off-Site Emergency Plan The main aspects, which should be included in the emergency plan, are: 7.8.2.1 Organization Details of command structure, warning systems, implementation procedures, emergency control centers. Names and appointments of incident controller, site main controller, their deputies and other key personnel. 7.8.2.2 Communications Identification of personnel involved, communication centre, call signs, network, lists of telephone numbers. 7.8.2.3 Specialized knowledge Details of specialist bodies, firms and people upon whom it may be necessary to call e.g. those with specialized chemical knowledge, laboratories. 7.8.2.4 Voluntary organizations Details of organizers, telephone numbers, resources etc. 7.8.2.5 Chemical information

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Chapter 7- 39

Details of the hazardous substances stored or processed on each site and a summary of the risk associated with them. 7.8.2.6 Meteorological information Arrangements for obtaining details of weather conditions prevailing at the time and weather forecasts. 7.8.2.7 Humanitarian arrangements Transport, evacuation centers, emergency feeding treatment of injured, First aid, ambulances, temporary mortuaries. 7.8.2.8 Public information Arrangements for: (a) dealing with the media press office; (b) informingrelatives, etc. 7.8.2.9 Assessment Arrangements for: (a) collecting information on the causes of the emergency; (b) reviewing the efficiency and effectiveness of all aspects of the emergency plan. 7.8.2.10 Role of the Emergency Co-ordinating Officer The various emergency services should be co-ordinated by an emergency co-ordinating officer (ECO), who will be designated by the District Collector. The ECO should liaise closely with the Site Controller. Again, depending on local arrangements, for very severe incidents with major or prolonged off-site consequences, the external control should be passed on to a senior local authority administrator or even an administrator appointed by the central or state government. 7.8.2.11 Role of the Local Authority The duty to prepare the off-site plan lies with the local authorities. The emergency planning officer (EPO) appointed should carry out his duty in preparing for a whole range of different emergencies within the local authority area. The EPO should liase with the works, to obtain the information to provide the basis for the plan. This liaison should ensure that the plan is continually kept up to date. It will be the responsibility of the EPO to ensure that all those organizations, which will be involved off site in, handling the emergency, know of their role and are able to accept it by having for example, sufficient staff and appropriate equipment to cover their particular responsibilities. Rehearsals for off-site plans should be organized by the EPO.

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Chapter 7- 40

7.8.2.12 Role of Police Formal duties of the police during an emergency include protecting life and property and controlling traffic movements. Their functions should include controlling bystanders, evacuating the public, identifying the dead and dealing with casualties, and informing relatives of dead or injured. 7.8.2.13 Role of Fire Authorities The control of a fire should normally be the responsibility of the senior fire brigade officer who would take over the handling of the fire from the site incident controller on arrival at the site. The senior fire brigade officer should also have a similar responsibility for other events, such as explosions and toxic release. Fire authorities in the region should be apprised about the location of all stores of flammable materials, water and foam supply points, and fire-fighting equipment. They should be involved in on-site emergency rehearsals both as participants and, on occasion, as observers of exercises involving on-site personnel. 7.8.2.14 Role of Health Authorities Health authorities, including doctors, surgeons, hospitals, ambulances, and similar other persons/institutions should have a vital part to play following a major accident, and they should form an integral part of the emergency plan. For major fires, injuries should be the result of the effects of thermal radiation to a varying degree, and the knowledge and experience to handle this in all but extreme cases may be generally available in most hospitals. For major toxic releases, the effects vary according to the chemical in question, and the health authorities should be apprised about the likely toxic releases from the plant, which will enable them to deal with the aftermath of a toxic release with treatment appropriate to such casualties. Major off-site incidents are likely to require medical equipment and facilities inadditional to those available locally, and a medical "mutual aid" scheme shouldexist to enable the assistance of neighboring authorities to be obtained in theevent of an emergency. 7.8.2.15 Role of Government Safety Authority This will be the factory inspectorate available in the region. Inspectors are likely to want to satisfy themselves that the organization responsible for producing the off-site plan has made adequate arrangements for handling emergencies of all types including major emergencies. They

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 41

may wish to see well documented procedures and evidence of exercise undertaken to test the plan. In the event of an accident, local arrangements regarding the role of the factory inspector will apply. These may vary from keeping a watch to a close involvement in advising on operations. While the industry will activate the DMP and take necessary alleviating measures and arrange to extend all medical and security support, the factory inspectorate may be the only external agency with equipment and resources to carry out appropriate tests to assess the impact.

7.8.3 External agencies contact details involved during emergency Table No. 7.15: Details of external agencies to be involved during emergency Sr. No.

Name of Hospital

1

Rachana hospital

2

Maya hospital

3

Wokhard hospital

Sr. No. 1 2

Sr. No. 1

Sr. No.

Name of Police Station Butibori police station MIDC police station Name of Fire Station Butibori MIDC Fire station Name of MIDC

1

Butibori MIDC

Sr. No.

Name of Municipality

Details of Hospitals Address P-26,MIDC Butibori Nagpur P-78,MIDC Butibori Nagpur 1643,north Ambazari road Nagpur 440033

Telephone

07103-262160

6 km

07103-684885

6 km

91-712-6624289/4444

40 km

Details of Police Stations Address Telephone Butibori main chowk

Distances

Distances

07103-262221

7 km

Near Central bank 07104-265135 Butibori MIDC Details of Fire Stations Address Telephone

2 km

Plot no. P-33,Near 07104-265465/66 BMA office Details of MIDC Offices Address Telephone

3 km

Five star zone area, Near central bank

07104-265252

Details of Municipal Corporations Address Telephone

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Distances

Distances 2 km

Distances

Chapter 7- 42

1

Sr. No. 1

Nagpur Municipal Civil line Nagpur 0712-2567035 corporation ( NMC) Details of Pollution Control Department Name of PCD Address Telephone Maharashtra pollution control board ( MPCB)

Udyog bhavan, 6th floor ,near sales tax office, civil line,nagpur-44001

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

0712-2565308

35 km Distances

40km

Chapter 7- 43

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 44

IPETC HAZOP STUDY Hazop Study Worksheet -1 Node: (3) Preparation of 30% SIPX solution by addition of SIPX powder / Pellets in water in S-403 Notes: Fresh Water (5563 Kg) is added from common water header to S-403 is done from DM plant through pump P-10 having flow 15 M3 / Hr. Equipment details: - S-403, MSGL, 10KL P & ID reference no. – IPETC-01-01-0400-01 Rev. 01, A5FP-25-25-1400-52 Parameter: Flow

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No . 3

Guide Word No

Deviation 3.1 No Flow

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Causes

PARAMETER

Temperature

Consequence

Safeguards

3.1.1. No DM water available in tank

3.1.1.1 Overheating of motor or churning

3.1.1.1.1 Float type level indicator at tank

3.1.2. Inlet or outlet valve in close condition

3.1.2.1. Overheating of motor or churning

3.1.2.1.1. SOP is in place and followed. Trained manpower 3.1.2.1.2 Water batch flow meter is in place at production block

3.1.3 Circulation valve in full open position

3.1.3.1 No consequences

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 45

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No . 3

Guide Word Less

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2

Deviation

Causes

3.2 less Flow

3.2.1. Basket Strainer Chock

PARAMETER

Temperature

Consequence

Safeguards

3.2.1.1 No Safety consequences

DESIGN S

P

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

R

3.2.1.1.1 Water batch flow meter is in place at Production block 3.2.1.1.2 Preventive maintenance schedule is in place and followed

Node: (4)Gradually charging of SIPX pellets (within 1 to 1.5 hours)under agitation using charging hopper to create SIPX solution. Notes: Required amount of SIPX gradually is charged in packaged additions (Jumbo bag) of 500 kg. Temperature is at 45-50 °C with complete dissolution of added SIPX. Charging system is open hopper feeding via valve into the reactor with N2 purge. S403is inerted via N2 blanketing system controlled by PCV41003. Hoppers are provided with N2 relief line (vent) to safe location. Liberated gas generated in S403 are condensed through overhead condensers and captured in Scrubber system (SCR402). Equipment details: - S-403, MSGL, 10KL, RPM P & ID reference no. – IPETC-01-01-0400-01 Rev. 01 Parameter: Flow

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No 4

Guide Word More

Process steps as per Section 2.2

Deviation 4.1. More Flow

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Causes 4.1.1. Operator adds SIPX bag too quickly

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

4.1.1.1. Entraining of SIPX powder into condenser, pressurization of system, emissions to atmosphere and fumes of SIPX, clogging of condenser and pressurization Of S403.

4.1.1.1.1. Rupture disc RD41010 on S403 of DN40 rated at 3 barg / T 145°C (LRS3C)

4.1.1.2. Rapid charging of next bag of SIPX with potential flash

4.1.1.2.1. Solid Charging Systems for SIPX

Chapter 7- 46

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION RD size to be reviewed through HEL. To avoid dust accumulation in working premises, Dust collector to be provided. Continuous CS2 and

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No

Guide Word

Other Than

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

fire due to static discharge from solids or bags - the decomposition by hydrolysis of SIPX in water solutions with the evolution of carbon disulfide gas that requires level 2 inerting control per SHE802 (Ignition Source And Internal Deflagration Controls For Process Vessels)

Hopper CP405 that limit introduction of air during addition and eliminates operator exposure (LNS2A)

4.1.2 Charging of extra water than required quantity

4.1.2.1 Overflow of S403

4.1.2.1.1 Batch flow meter available on reactor

4.1.3. Charging of extra quantity of SIPX than required quantity

4.1.3.1 No safety consequences

4.2.1. Operator adds SIPX first instead of Water

4.2.1.1. There may be chances of damage glass line reactor due to addition of SIPX pellets during agitation in absence of water.

Deviation

4.2. Misdirected sequence

Causes

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION O2 monitoring system to be provided and maintained. Continuous Nitrogen monitoring to be done after defined interval.

4.1.1.2.2. Inerting of S403 controlled by PCV and PSL meeting requirements of LNS2A

Inerting of Hopper controlled by PCV and PSL meeting requirements of LNS2A to be provided

4.1.2.1.2 High level alarm available on S403

SIPX to be procured in antistatic jumbo bags.

4.1.3.1.1SOP to be followed

Hooter to be provided on level or agitator interlock with level and charging hoper valve interlock

Parameter: Temperature

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No .

Guide Word

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2

Deviation

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Causes

PARAMETER

Temperature

Consequence

Safeguards

Chapter 7- 47

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS / ACTION

4

More

Less

4.3. Higher Temperature

4.4. Lower Temperature

4.3.1. Operator error steam valve opened, mass temperature exceeds desired temp.

4.3.1.1. Due to high temperaturedecomposition may raise the temperature to the auto-ignition point of the carbon disulfide decomposition product , causing spontaneous combustion.

4.3.2 Due to external fire

4.3.2.1 Over pressurize system, fail vessel, injury to Employee.

4.4.1. Operator error, No steam applied to S403

4.4.1.1. Batch delay due to longer time for the mixing

4.3.1.1.1. PVRV 40814 design at 25mbarg

RD size to be reviewed through HEL. Temperature to becontrolled by TCV on steam supply interlocked with TIC on reactor. RD size to be reviewed through HEL. PVRV 40814 design at 25mbarg and it is to be connected to the scrubber system SCR-402

4.3.1.1.2Rupture disc RD41010 on S403 of DN40 rated at 3 barg / T 145°C (LRS3C) 4.3.1.1.3. Rupture disc RD41010 on S403 of DN40 rated at 3 barg / T 145°C (LRS3C)

SOP to be followed

Parameter: Pressure

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No . 4

Guide Word More

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2

Deviation 4.5. Higher Pressure due to(nitrogen used for blanketing in S-403 not more than 10mbarg)

Causes 4.5.1.PCV failure

PARAMETER

Pressure

Consequence

Safeguards

4.5.1.1. No SHE consequences

4.5.1.1.1.PSV134502 on nitrogen header set at 0.88 barg RD provided on S-403 set at 3 barg at 145 Deg C.

S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS / ACTION RD size to be reviewed through HEL.

4.5.1.1.2. After failure of PCV N2 pressure will not go beyond 15mbarg. 4.5.1.1.3. PCV preventive maintenance schedule is in

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

DESIGN

Chapter 7- 48

Temperature to be controlled by TCV on

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No .

Guide Word

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2

Deviation

Causes

PARAMETER

Pressure

Consequence

Safeguards

DESIGN S

P

R

place and followed. Higher pressure due to decompositio n of SIPX High pressure

4.5.2. High temperature of S403 content

4.5.1.2 No SHE consequences

4.5.3. Failure ofPRV103703/PSV103704

4.5.1.3 High pressurization of S403 in jacket due to failure of PRV103703/PSV103704.

RECOMMENDATONS / ACTION steam supply interlocked with TIC on reactor. RD size to be reviewed through HEL.

4.5.1.2.1 PVRV 40814 design at 25mbarg RD provided on S-403 will protect the vessel set at 3 barg at 145 Deg.C

S403 jacket hydrotesting to be done.

4.5.1.3.1 PRV103703 set at 3.4 barg and incorporated in PM schedule and followed. 4.5.1.3.2 PSV103704 set at 3.5 barg and incorporated in PM schedule and followed.

Parameter :Agitation

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No .

Guide Word

4

Agitation

Deviation 4.6. No agitation

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Causes

PARAMETER

Pressure

Consequence

Safeguards

4.6.1 Power failure

4.6.1.1No SHE consequences

4.6.1.1.1 Back up DG set 750KVA provided

4.6.2 Human error ; forgot to start the agitation

4.6.2.2 Homogeneous mixture will not form

SOP available

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 49

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS / ACTION

Need to provide the hooter or alarm on DCS SOP training to be

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No .

Guide Word

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2

Deviation

Causes

PARAMETER

Pressure

Consequence

Safeguards

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS / ACTION provided to the operators

Node: (5) Transferring of 30% SIPX solution from S-403 to R-405 or R-406 via pump P-404 Notes: After preparation of 30% SIPX solution, transfer it to R-405 or R-406 via pump P-404 of capacity of 5 Cu.M/hr. at 15M head with DN40 pipe sizing at the velocity of 1 m/sec. Equipment details: - S-403, MSGL, 10KL,: R-405, 16KL, MSGL: R-406, 12.5KL, MSGL: P & ID reference no. – IPETC-01-01-0400-01 Rev. 01, IPETC-01-01-0400-03 Rev01, IPETC-01-01-0400-07 Rev. 01, IPETC-01-01-0400-09 Rev. 01 Parameter: Flow

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No .

Guide Word

Deviation

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Causes

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

PARAMETER

Pressure

Consequence

Safeguards

Chapter 7- 50

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS / ACTION

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No . 5

Guide Word

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2

Deviation

Causes

PARAMETER

Pressure

Consequence

Safeguards

More

Higher flow

5.1.1 Not credible

5.1.1.1 No SHE consequences

Less or No

Low flow

5.1.2 Pump strainer blocked

5.1.1.2 Operational issue; batch delay

5.1.1.2.1Pump & strainer periodic maintenance schedule prepared

5.1.3 30% solution is not homogenous

5.1.1.3 Operational issue; batch delay

5.1.1.3.1. Viewglass is installed in the pump suction of P-404

5.1.4 Charge SIPX solution in R-405 instead of R-406 or vice versa

5.1.1.4 Overfilling of vessel of R-405 or R-406 No safety concern

Misdirected flow

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No .

Guide Word

Deviation

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS / ACTION

SOP training to be given to all operators.

5.1.1.4.1Interlock of level with transfer line MOV

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Causes

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

PARAMETER

Pressure

Consequence

Safeguards

Chapter 7- 51

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS / ACTION

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No . 5

Guide Word High

Low

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2

PARAMETER

Pressure

Consequence

Safeguards

5.2.1 Receiving line MOV closed

5.2.1.1 No SHE consequences

5.2.1.1.1 Power monitor installed on the pump, hence pump will be tripped

5.2.2 Human error; forgot to open suction valve of pump P404

5.2.1.2 No SHE consequences

Deviation Pressure

Pressure

Causes

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS / ACTION

5.2.1.1.2 Power monitor installed on the pump, hence pump will be tripped

Node: (6) Preparation of 10% Nickel Sulfate Hexa-Hydrate solution by addition of solid Nickel Sulfate Hexa- hydrate in water at ambient temperature Notes: Fresh Water (688 Kg) is added from common water header to SR-401is done from DM plant through pump P-10 having flow 15 M3 / Hr. Equipment details: - SR-401, PP, 6KL P & ID reference no. – IPETC-01-01-0400-04 Rev. 01, A5FP-25-25-1400-52 Parameter: Flow

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No . 6

Guide Word No

Deviation 6.1 No Flow

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Causes

PARAMETER

Temperature

Consequence

Safeguards

6.1.1. No DM water available in tank

6.1.1.1 Overheating of motor or churning

6.1.1.1.1 Float type level indicator at tank

6.1.2. Inlet or outlet valve in

6.1.2.1. Overheating of motor or

6.1.2.1.1. SOP is in place and

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 52

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No .

Guide Word

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2

Deviation

Causes

PARAMETER

Temperature

Consequence

Safeguards

close condition

churning

6.1.3 Circulation valve in full open position

6.1.3.1 No consequences

No . 6

Guide Word Less

Deviation 6.2 less Flow

S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

followed. Trained manpower 6.1.2.1.2 Water batch flow meter is in place at production block

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION

DESIGN

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Causes 6.2.1. Basket Strainer Chock

PARAMETER

Temperature

Consequence

Safeguards

6.2.1.1 No Safety consequences

6.2.1.1.1 Water batch flow meter is in place at Production block 6.2.1.1.2 Preventive maintenance schedule is in place and followed

Node: (7) Gradually charging of Nickelsulfate Hexa-Hydrate to prepare10% NiSO4.6H2Osolution.

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 53

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

Notes: Required amount of solid NiSO4.6H2O gradually is charged from25 kg bag. at ambient temperature and atmospheric pressure in SR-401 vessel through manhole. Equipment details: - SR-401, PP, 6KL, P & ID No. – IPETC-01-01-0400-04 Rev. 01 Parameter: Flow

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No 7

Guide Word More

Other Than

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2

Deviation

Causes

7.1. More Flow

7.2. Composition

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

7.1.1. Operator adds NiSO4.6H20 bag too quickly

7.1.1.1. No SHE consequences

7.1.2 Charging of extra water than required quantity

7.1.1.2. No SHE consequences

7.1.3. Charging of extra quantity of NiSO4.6H2O than required quantity

7.1.1.3 No SHE consequences

7.2.1. Operator adds NiSO4.6H2O first instead of Water

7.2.1.1. No SHE consequences

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION Follow SOP

Parameter: Temperature

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No

Guide Word

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2

Deviation

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Causes

PARAMETER

Temperature

Consequence

Safeguards

Chapter 7- 54

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS / ACTION

. 7

More

7.3. Higher Temperature

7.3.1Not credible as preparation is under at ambient temp ; No heating facility

7.3.1.1.No SHE consequences

Less

7.3.2 Lower Temperature

7.3.2.1 Not credible

7.3.2.1 No SHE consequences

Parameter: Pressure

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No . 7

Guide Word

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2

PARAMETER

Pressure

Consequence

Safeguards

Deviation

Causes

More

7.4. Higher Pressure

7.4.1. Not credible

7.4.1.1. No SHE consequences

Less

7.4 Low pressure

7.4.2. Not credible

7.4.2.1. No SHE consequences

Parameter : Agitation

HAZOP STUDY Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM Chapter 7- 55

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS / ACTION

DESIGN INTENSION No .

Guide Word

7

Agitation

Process steps as per Section 2.2

Deviation 7.5. No agitation

Causes

PARAMETER

Pressure

Consequence

Safeguards

7.5.1 Power failure

7.5.1.1 No SHE consequences

7.5.1.1.1 Back up DG set 750KVA provided

7.5.2 Human error ; forgot to start the agitation

7.5.2.1Non credible

Follow SOP

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS / ACTION

Node: (8) Transferring of 10% Nickel sulfatehexa hydrate solution from SR-401 to R-405 or R-406 via pump P-407 Notes: After preparation of 10% Nickel sulfate hexa hydrate solution, transfer it to R-405 or R-406 via pump P-407 of capacity of 5 Cu.M/hr. at 25M head with DN40 pipe sizing at the velocity of 1.1 m/sec. Equipment details: - SR-401, PP, 6KL,P-407:R-405, 16KL, MSGL: R-406, 12.5KL, MSGL: P & ID No. – IPETC-01-01-0400-04 Rev. 01, IPETC-01-01-0400-07 Rev.01, IPETC-01-01-0400-09 Rev.01 Parameter: Flow

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No .

Guide Word

Deviation

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Causes

PARAMETER

Pressure

Consequence

Safeguards

More

Higher flow

8.1.1 Not credible

8.1.1.1 No SHE consequences

Less or No

Low flow

8.1.2 Pump strainer blocked

8.1.1.2 Operational issue; batch delay

Pump & strainer periodic maintenance schedule prepared

Misdirected flow

8.1.3 Charge 10% NiSO4.6H2O solution in R405 instead of R-406 or vice

8.1.1.3No SHE consequences

Interlock of level with transfer line MOV

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 56

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS / ACTION

SOP training to be given to all concerns and recorded.

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No .

Guide Word

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2

Deviation

Causes

PARAMETER

Pressure

Consequence

Safeguards

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS / ACTION

versa

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No .

Guide Word High

Low

Deviation Pressure

Pressure

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Causes

PARAMETER

Pressure

Consequence

Safeguards

8.2.1 Receiving line MOV closed

8.2.1.1 No SHE consequences

8.2.2 Human error; forgot to open suction valve of pump P407 or bottom valve of SR-401

8.2.2.1 No SHE consequences

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS / ACTION

Follow SOP

Node: (9),Charging of 70% MEA to VR-201 / VR-400A by barrel pump BP-401/402. Notes: 70% MEA ischarged with electric barrel pump (max capacity 2 m³/H) from drum to receiver VR201/VR400A after QC control of composition. Based on DN25 charging lines, velocity of transfer is 1.4 m/s. VR201& VR400A is provided with CHWS and not provided with heating. There is inerting on VR201& VR400A

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 57

(N2 blanketing controlled by PCV40113& PCV40108 on these vessel respectively). Drum is grounded and bonded, having visible earth monitoring device / clamp; fixed piping and dip tube into VR201& VR400A. Drum charging line to VR201 & VR400A is carving on recirculation line of VR201& VR400A pump. 3 Equipment details: - VR-201, 6.1 Kl, SS304L (Jacketed), VR-400A, 4.33 Kl, SS304L (Jacketed), BP-401/402, 2M at 10Mtr head, P & ID No. – IPETC-01-01-0400-05 Rev. 01, IPETC-01-01-0400-06 Rev.01 Parameter: Flow

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2

No .

Guide Word

Deviation

Causes

9

More

9.1. More Flow

9.1.1. High flow 70% MEA from drum into VR201 or VR400A

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

S

P

R

9.1.1.1.1. Grounding/bonding + dip tube into VR201 & VR400A

5

2

7

3

3

6

9.1.1.1. Electrostatic sparking / solvent vapor ignition; internal fire, explosion; employee injury

DESIGN

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

9.1.1.1.2. Nitrogen blanketing onVR201 & VR400A 9.1.1.1.3 CHWS provided on VR201 & VR400A

Reverse

9.2. Reverse Flow

9.2.1. Reverse flow from VR201/VR400A into drum; wrongsequence of valve

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

9.2.1.1. backflow of MEA from VR201/VR400A to drum with spill /operator exposure; drum wouldhave to be full

9.2.1.1.1. Check valve to prevent backflow cannot take credit for checkvalve until confirm

Chapter 7- 58

Confirm check valve onMEA loading line to VR201/VR400A will qualify as by insuring it is onthe PI/PM list of safety criticalInstruments. Also need tag nr on P&ID

Parameter: Temperature

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2

No .

Guide Word

Deviation

9

More

9.3. Higher Temperature

Causes

PARAMETER

Temperature

Consequence

Safeguards

S

P

R

9.3.1.1.1. RD40124 on VR201: DN80 rated at 1 barg and T=140°C - sized for external.

3

3

6

3

3

6

9.3.1. External fire on VR201 or VR400A caused by spill of nearby flammable mixture & ignition

9.3.1.1 Over pressurization of VR201 & VR400A

9.3.2 Due to region environmental condition

9.3.2.1 Over pressurization of VR201 & VR400A

DESIGN

9.3.1.1.2. RD40103 VR400A: DN80 rated at 1 barg and T=85°C - sized for external.

9.3.2.1.1. Conservation vent PVRV40120 on VR201 & PVRV40109 on VR400A connected to scrubber SCR401

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

Revalidation report on all vent sizes for all vessels and ancillary equipment. Confirm sizing for this scenario

Conservation vent ofVR201 & VR400A to be connected to condenser and condenser vent to be connected to scrubber SCR401.

Detonation arrestor to be provided between scrubber header and vent line of VR201 & VR400A.

Parameter: Pressure

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No

Guide Word

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2

Deviation

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Causes

PARAMETER

Pressure

Consequence

Safeguards

Chapter 7- 59

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

. 9

More

9.4. Higher Pressure

9.4.1. Nitrogen overpressure on VR201& VR400A

9.4.1.1. Over pressurization of VR201 & VR400A

9.4.1.1.1. RD40124 on VR201: DN80 rated at 1 barg and T=140°C - sized for external.

3

3

6

9.4.1.1.2. RD40103 VR400A: DN80 rated at 1 barg and T=85°C - sized for external.

Revalidation report on all vent sizes for all vessels and ancillary equipment. Confirm sizing for this scenario

Conservation vent of VR201 & VR400A to be connected to condenser and condenser vent to be connected to scrubber SCR401.

9.4.1.1.3. Conservation vent PVRV40120 on VR201 & PVRV40109 on VR400A connected to scrubber SCR401

Detonation arrestor to be provided between scrubber header and vent line of VR201 & VR400A.

Parameter: Composition

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No .

Guide Word

Deviation

9

Other Than

Composition

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Causes

PARAMETER

Composition

Consequence

Safeguards

Not credible

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 60

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

Parameter: Level

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2

No .

Guide Word

Deviation

Causes

9

More

9.6. Higher Level

9.6.1. Overfill VR201& VR400A, add toomany drums

PARAMETER

Level

Consequence

Safeguards

S

P

R

9.6.1.1.1. Interlock on level highin VR201 will close MOV40119 via LIT40116 and Interlock on level high in VR400A will close MOV40104 via LIT40105

3

1

4

9.6.1.1. Overfill VR201 & VR400A, releaseto the environment

DESIGN

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

Node: (10) Mixing and heating of 30% SIPX solution & 10% Nickel Sulfate Hexa Hydrate solution. o Notes: Apply steam to R405 jacket, heat content up to 79-80 C. P & ID No. – IPETC-01-01-0400-07 Rev. 01 Parameter: Temperature

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No .

Guide Word

10

More

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2

PARAMETER

Temperature

Consequence

Safeguards

Deviation

Causes

19.1. Higher Temperature

19.1.1. External fire on VR201& VR400A or R405 caused by spill of nearby flammable mixture &ignition. External fire scenario for R405 system

19.1.1.1 Over pressurize system, fail vessel, injury to Employee.

19.1.1.1.1. Rupture disc RD41707 on R405 of DN150 rated at 3.4 barg / T 150°C (LRS3C)

19.1.2. Apply too high heat

19.1.2.1 Due to high temperature decomposition may raise the temperature to the auto-ignition point of the carbon disulfide decomposition

19.1.2.1.1. Temperature controlled by TCV 41706 on steam supply interlocked with TIC41710 on reactor.

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Chapter 7- 61

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION RD size to be reviewed through HEL. PRV 41709 design at 25mbarg and it is to be connected to the scrubber system SCR-402 RD size to be

product , causing spontaneous combustion.

19.1.2.1.2. PRV 41709 design at 25mbarg

19.1.3. External fire for heat exchangers HE-404A & B not credible; located one level above ground on checkered plate floor that cannot contain Liquids. 19.1.4. Loss of cooling & Chilling water on condenser

reviewed through HEL.

19.1.2.1.3. Rupture disc RD41707 on R405 of DN150 rated at 3.4 barg / T 150°C (LRS3C)

19.1.4.1 Vaporload increase on scrubber SCR402 or may direct vent out from scrubber system.

Scrubber to be designed by considering extreme condition of increase in vapor load.

19.1.4.1.1 PSV 41221 & PSV41229 provided on HE 404A&B respectively.

Parameter: Agitation

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No .

Guide Word

10

No

Deviation 19.2. No Agitation

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Causes 19.2.1. Power failure, loss of agitation

PARAMETER

Agitation

Consequence

Safeguards

19.2.1.1. No SHE consequence before adding MEA

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

Back up DG set 750KVA provided

Node: (11)Once the temperature reaches to 79-80oC, start adding specified qty1390 Kgof 70% MEA from 70% MEA Day tank VR-201 / VR-400A by pump P-203. Notes: Charging is done with centrifugal pump P203 that has max. capacity of 10 m³/H; there is a flow meter to control charging rate and recirculation line to VR201. Basedon this flow rate and DN40 of charging line connected to DN80, Charging line is without dip tube into R405. MEA charging done at 79 to 80°C; then maintained for 12 Hrsbetween 79 to 80°C by steam control valve. Note that boiling point of MEA is 38°C. During maintaining, operator uses log sheet every 30 minutes to record critical data. R405 is inerted via N2 sweep controlled by flow indicator. P & ID No. – IPETC-01-01-0400-05 Rev. 01, IPETC-01-01-0400-07 Rev.01 Parameter: Flow

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 62

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

No .

Guide Word

11

More

20.1. More Flow

20.1.1. Operator error, charging of extra quantity of MEA or high flow MEA into R405, FQIC40122 failure by operator reset or else

20.1.1.1. No HSE consequences, material will loss

Other Than

20.2. Misdirected Flow

20.2.1. Misdirected flow to R406 because of wrong selection of MOV

20.2.2.1. No SHE consequence

Deviation

Causes

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

20.2.2.1.1 High level interlock with MOV 47101 20.2.2.1.2 High temperature interlock with MOV 47101

Parameter: Temperature

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No .

Guide Word

11

More

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2

Deviation 20.3. Higher Temperature

Causes 20.3.1. Excess steam on R405

PARAMETER

Temperature

Consequence

Safeguards

S

P

R

20.3.1.1. Reaction mass temperature 0 exceeds more than 90 C, CS2 & H2S will liberate from the reaction mass and it will consider a minor decomposition.

13.3.1.1.1. High temperature in R405 closes TV41706.

5

3

8

13.3.1.1.2. Scrubber SCR402 has been designed on the basis of gas liberation rate 13.3.1.1.3. High temperature alarm indication with hooter is in place. 13.3.1.1.4. RD of DN150 on R405 rated at 3.4barg and T

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Chapter 7- 63

DESIGN

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

Revalidation report on all vent sizes for al vessels and ancillary equipment. Confirm sizing for this scenario from process hazard lab.

Possibility of providing cooling media during decomposition to be

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No .

Guide Word

Deviation

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Causes

PARAMETER

Temperature

Consequence

Safeguards =150°C.

20.3.2 Mislocation of temperature probe

20.3.2.1 Correct mass temperature may not show

13.3.2. Loss of cooling (in condenser HE404A/B)

13.3.2.1. Vapor load increase on scrubber SCR402 or may direct vent out from scrubber system.

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION checked

To be defined PM/PI program

Pressure switch to be provided on CHWS & CWS inlet line and indication with hooter to be provided.

Revalidation report on all vent sizes for al vessels and ancillary equipment. Confirm sizing for this scenario from process hazard lab.

Scrubber to be designed by considering extreme condition of increase in vapor load.

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Chapter 7- 64

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No .

Guide Word Less

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2

Deviation

Causes

13.4. Lower Temperature

13.4.1. Operator error

PARAMETER

Temperature

Consequence

Safeguards

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

13.4.1.1. No HSE consequences

Parameter : Pressure

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No . 13

Guide Word More

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2

PARAMETER

Flow

Causes

Consequence

Safeguards

13.5.1 Due to decomposition of SIPX

13.5.1.1 Reaction mass temperature exceeds more than 0 90 C, CS2 & H2S will liberate from the reaction mass and it will consider a minor decomposition.

13.5.1.1.1. High temperature in R405 closes TV41706.

Deviation

13.5 High pressure

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

13.5.1.1.2 PIT 41708 indicate the pressure

Chapter 7- 65

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION Revalidation report on all vent sizes for all vessels and ancillary equipment. Confirm sizing for

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No .

Guide Word

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

Causes

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION this scenario from process hazard lab.

13.5.1.1.3. Scrubber SCR402 has been designed on the basis of gas liberation rate 13.5.1.1.4. High temperature alarm indication with hooter is in place. 13.5.1.1.5. RD of DN150 on R405 rated at 3.4 barg and T =150°C. 13

Less

13.6 Low pressure

13.6.1 Low N2 pressure during reaction

13.6.1.1 Oxidation of reaction mass ; No HSE consequences

13.6.1.1.1 PIT 41708 indicate and PCV 41701 controlled the N2 pressure

Node(14) :- Sampling of IPETC forchecking pH, IPETC strength, IPA, Free SIPX and MEA content.

Notes :Sample is drawn from R-405and sent to QC lab for checking pH, IPETC strength, IPA, Free SIPX and MEA content during maintaining. Another sample is drawn and sent to QC lab of MEA addition for checking pH, IPETC strength, IPA, Free SIPX and MEA content. P & ID No. – IPETC-01-01-0400-07 Rev. 01

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Chapter 7- 66

Parameter : Flow

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No . 14

More

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

Guide Word

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM Causes

14.1 High flow

14.1.1 Human error ; Sampling valve fully opened

14.1.1.1 body

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

DESIGN S

P

R

Spill or splash on operator

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION Follow SOP and PPE matrix

Parameter : Temperature

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No . 14

Guide Word High

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

14.2 High temperature

Causes 14.2.1 Human error ; Sampling valve fully opened

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

14.2.1.1 Hot reaction mixture may splash on body; employee burn injury

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION Follow SOP and PPE matrix

Node (15): Allow to separate the reaction mixture in two phases Notes : After completion of 12 hrs in R-405 at 79-80oC under agitation, stop the agitator to allow for the two phases to separate for 1 hr. After phase separation, remove the solid precipitate containing Nickel sulfidefrom the bottom drain valve of R-405 in SS-Bucket or container and measure the qty of solid precipitate. The remaining suspended solids to be collected from the online filter system. All the collected solid precipitate will go to catalyst supplier for catalyst recycle or for disposal to external party.

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Chapter 7- 67

The aqueous Mother Liquor layer is then decanted to vessels STT-503/STT-506 via pump P-418 under close supervision. The aqueous layer is passed through Filter F-405 for trapping of solids. As soon as organic layer is seen in the bottom pipeline view glass of R-405 close the bottom valve. R405 is glass-lined MS vessel of 16 m3, which is inerted with N2 controlled by PCV41701. Pressure rating of R405 is 6.8 barg at 268°C. Decantation by centrifugal pump P418 which has max capacity of 15 m³/Hr. at 15m head. P & ID No. – IPETC-01-01-0400-07 Rev. 01, IPETC-01-01-0500-16 Rev.01, IPETC-01-01-0500-20 Rev.01 Parameter : Flow

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No . 15

Other than

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

Guide Word

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM Causes

15.1 Misdirected flow

15.1.1 Valve misalignment

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

14.1.1.1 Overfilling of vessel either STT-503/STT-506 and new vessel

14.1.1.1.1 LIT 56111 and LIT 56602 is in place on the vessel STT-503 and STT506 respectively

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION High alarm indication and hooter to be installed Follow SOP

Pararmeter : Pressure

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No . 15

Guide Word More

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

15.2 High pressure

Causes 15.2.1 High pressure in STT-503 , STT-506 and new vessel

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

15.2.1.1 Not credible as vessels are open vented

Chapter 7- 68

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No . 15

Less

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

Guide Word

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM Causes

15.3 Low pressure

15.3.1 Pump suction or strainer or filter blocked

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

15.3.1.1 Not credible as transferring done at 80 Deg.C

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

15.3.1.1.1. Power monitor is provided on the pump P-418

Parameter :- Temperature

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No .

Guide Word

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

Causes

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

15

Less

15.4 Low temperature

15.4.1Reaction mass temperature too low

15.4.1.1 Not credible as liquid is not having properties of formation of crystal at lower temperature

15

More

15.5 High temperature

15.5.1 Reaction mass transferring temperature at 80 Deg.C

15.5.1.1.Chances of hot burn injury

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

Insulation for safety to be provided over transferring line PPE matrix to be followed

Parameter : Other than

HAZOP STUDY

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Chapter 7- 69

DESIGN INTENSION No . 15

Deviation

Guide Word Other than

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Causes

15.6 Incorrect material

15.6.1. Overdecantation of R-405 liquid in STT-503, STT-506 & new vessel

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

DESIGN S

P

R

15.6.1.1 Overfilling of STT-503, STT506 and new vessels

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION High level alarm indication and hooter to be installed Follow SOP

Node (16): Transfer of crude IPETC from R-405 to VR-411 and VR-413 via pump P-417 Notes: The top organic phase containing crude IPETC is decanted to VR-411/VR-413 via pump P417 P & ID No. – IPETC-01-01-0400-07 Rev. 01, IPETC-01-01-0400-11 Rev.01 Parameter : Flow

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No . 16

Other than

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

Guide Word

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

16.1 Misdirected flow

Causes 16.1.1 Pump P-418 used for organic transfer instead of P-417

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

DESIGN S

16.1.1.1 No HSE consequences as multiple manual valve operation

Pararmeter : Pressure

HAZOP STUDY

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Chapter 7- 70

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

DESIGN INTENSION No . 16

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

16.2.1 Vent valve closed over VR413

16.2.1.1 Over pressurization of vessels, rupture of vessel; employee injury

16.2.1.1.1 RD41414 DN50 set at 4 barg will take care for high pressure

Vent valve on VR-413 to be kept locked open

16.2.2 Human error MOV41410 closed in between VR-411 & VR413

16.2.2.1 Over pressurization of VR-411

16.2.2.1.1 RD41404 DN40 set at 4 barg will take care foe high pressure

Conservation vent need to provide on VR-411

Deviation

Guide Word More

Process steps as per Section 2.2

16.2 High pressure

Causes

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

Parameter :- Temperature

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No . 16

More

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

Guide Word

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

16.3 High temperature

Causes

16.3.1 Reaction mass transferring temperature at 80 Deg.C

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION Insulation for safety to be provided over transferring line and VR-411 & VR-413

16.3.1.1.Chances of hot burn injury

PPE matrix to be followed

Parameter : Other than

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No .

Guide Word

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Causes

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

Chapter 7- 71

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No . 16

Other than

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

Guide Word

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM Causes

16.4 Incorrect material

16.4.1. Human error; forgot to decant aqueous layer

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

16.4.1.1 Overfilling of VR-411 & VR-413

DESIGN S

P

16.4.1.1.1 High level interlock on VR-413 with MOV41410

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION High level alarm indication and hooter to be installed Follow SOP

Node(17) : Removal of IPA and other volatile components from crude IPETC to form Finished IPETC Notes :- Transferof crude IPETC from VR-411/VR-413 to ATFE-201 via Pump P408 capacity of 1 Cu.M/hr. at 40m head for further treatment for removal of traces of water, IPA and other volatile impuritiesPumping crude IPETC from VR-413 to ATFE via pump P408 at max 1 m³/H (continuous feed). Piping is DN50 leading to velocity of 0.14 m/s. Drying of crude IPETC in ATFE (= agitated thin film evaporator ) which is heated with 2.0-3.4 barg steam (supply 3.5barg) Condensation of vapors in HE-208, then condensate sent to VR215 (SS, 1m³). Deep vacuum source is water ejector system using vacuum trap VR-216, water trap WT-202, water ejector E-202, Ejector tank ET-202. Transfer of dried and purified IPETC bottom of ATFE to VR214A/B (vacuum receivers) which are glass lined MS vessels of 1.6m³ capacity, cooling and collectionin either holdup tank VR-213 (PP vessel of 5 m³).Cleaning of operation with water if needed. P & ID No. – IPETC-01-01-0200-12 Rev. 01, IPETC-01-01-0400-11 Rev.01, IPETC-01-01-0200-13 Rev.01, IPETC-01-01-0200-15 Rev.01, IPETC-01-01-0200-14 Rev.01 Parameter: Flow

AZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No .

Guide Word

17

More

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

17.1. More Flow

Causes

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

17.1.1 High flow from VR-413 to ATFE201 from P-408

17.1.1.1 No HSE consequences

17.1.2. High flow from VR-

17.1.2.1. No SHE

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Chapter 7- 72

DESIGN S

P

R

3

2

5

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

AZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No .

Guide Word

Less

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

17.2. Low flow out of ATFE

Causes

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

214A/B to VR213, resulting from feed to ATFE too high.

consequences

17.1.3. High flow to VR-215, condensate receiver due high feed to ATFE.

17.1.3.1. No SHE Consequences

17.1.4. More flow to vacuum side of ATFE and bottom valve also closed

17.1.4.1 No SHE consequences

17.1.4.1.1 Interlock on temperature high in ATFE will close steam supply (PV 22109) and IPETC feed by TI22101 at bottom of ATFE

17.2.1. Blocked discharge valve on ATFE

17.2.1.1. No HSE consequences

17.2.1.1.1. Interlock on temperature high in ATFE will close steam supply (PV 22109) and IPETC feed by TI22101 at bottom of ATFE

DESIGN S

P

R

3

2

5

17.2.1.1.2. Interlock on level high in ATFE will close steam supply (PV22109) and oxime feed by PDT22102 at bottom of ATFE

.

17.2.1.1.3. RD22106 on ATFE of DN100 (set pressure still to be define) 17.2.2. Low flow of cooling water to ATFE condenser

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

17.2.2.1.1. PSV22104 rated at 5 barg on utility

Chapter 7- 73

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

3

2

5

AZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No .

Guide Word

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

Causes

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

DESIGN S

P

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

R

side of HE-208 sized for blocked-in condensor scenario

Reverse

17.3. Reverse Flow

17.2.3. Low flow lubricant to bottom bushing

17.2.3.1. Vibration, equipment damage, no SHE concern

17.3.1. Power failure while system under vacuum

17.3.1.1. No HSE consequences

17.3.1.1.1 MOV22415 protect the system from ingress of air

Parameter: Temperature

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No .

Guide Word

17

More

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

17.4. Higher Temperature

Causes 17.4.1. Blocked discharge valve on ATFE , low flow, block in IPETC in ATFE

17.4.2. Operator error, IPETC at too high temperature in VR214A/B; due to cooling water on jacket closed/external fire

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

PARAMETER

Temperature

Consequence

Safeguards

DESIGN S

P

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

R

No HSE consequences

17.4.2.1.1. RD22206/RD22210 on resp VR214A/B. DN100 rated at 2.5 barg and T=150°C - sized for external fire as worst case scenario PSV installed on CWR side

Chapter 7- 74

:

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No .

Guide Word

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

Causes

PARAMETER

Temperature

Consequence

Safeguards of VR-214A/B

17.4.1. High temperature in piping or in VR-213 caused by operator error in VR-214A or B (insufficient cooling time)

17.4.1.1. Damage to VR-213 (PP vessel), release to environment, potential for employee injury. Considered not credible as tank can withstand 100°C.

17.4.1.1.1 High temp.(60 Deg .C) closes MOV22309 to prevent draining of IPETC in VR-213

17.4.2. External fire on VR214A/B

17.4.2.1 Rupture of equipment

17.4.2.1.1. RD22206/RD22210 on resp VR214A/B. DN100 rated at 2.5 barg and T=150°C - sized for external fire as worst case

DESIGN S

P

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

R .

. 17.4.3. External fire on VR213

17.4.3.1. Melting of VR213

17.4.3.1.1. None

17.4.4. External fire on R206

17.4.4.1. Melting of R206

17.4.4.1.1. None

17.4.5. External fire on VR215

17.4.5.1. Rupture of equipment

17.4.5.1.1. RD22410 on VR215. DN40 rated at 2.5 barg and T=150°C - sized for external fire as worst case scenario

17.4.6. External fire on HE208 - actually non-credible

17.4.6.1. Rupture of equipment

17.4.6.1.1. PSV22104 rated at 4 barg on utility

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 75

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No .

Guide Word

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

Causes because of location (> 25ft above grade) but scenario developed anyway.

PARAMETER

Temperature

Consequence

Safeguards side of HE-208 sized for blocked-in condenser Scenario 17.4.6.1.2. Process side protected by RD on VR214A/B rated for external fire

`

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 76

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

Parameter: Pressure

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No .

Guide Word

17

More

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

17.5. Higher Pressure

Causes

PARAMETER

Pressure

Consequence

Safeguards

DESIGN S

P

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

R

17.5.1. See high temperature and low flow scenarios 17.5.2. Pumping liquid from VR213 into R-206, open vent to atmosphere makes scenario non-credible 17.5.3. Discharge P-408, piston pump, run pump deadheaded

17.5.3.1. High pressure in discharge piping, P-408 is a positive displacement pump, lead to piping failure or gasket failure, loss of containment

17.5.3.1.1. No control on P-408 discharge pressure

17.5.4. High nitrogen pressure due to supply regulator faiure to VR214A/B, VR216 (vacuum trap connected to ATFE-201) when breaking vacuum

17.5.4.1. Overpressurization of VR214A/B, VR216, ATFE-201

17.5.4.1.1. RD on all equipment sized for worst case of external fire scenario - will cover this scenario as well

17.5.5. High steam pressure on ATFE-201 .

17.5.5.1. Overpressure ATFE201, potential for vessel rupture, employee injury

17.5.5.1.1. Relief device PSV103704 on steam header

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

.

.

Chapter 7- 77

.

Parameter: Level

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No .

Guide Word

17

More

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

17.6. Higher Level

Causes

PARAMETER

Level

Consequence

Safeguards

17.6.2.1. Overfill VR21A/B that will fill-up piping upto ATFE

17.6.2.1.1. Level high interlock on VR214A/B will stop P408 on ATFE feed controlled by IT2202/22214

17.6.1. High level in ATFE201, bottom valve closed see no flow and high temperature scenarios 17.6.2. High level in VR214A/B, bottom valve closed with multiple batches fed to .these receivers

17.6.2.2. See no flow/high temperature scenarios for consequence in ATFE 17.6.3. High level in VR-213, previous batch not removed

17.6.3.1. Overfilling of VR-213 with non-hazardous spill into workshop

17.6.4. High level in VR-216 vacuum trap due to operator error, failure to drain system . 17.6.5. High level in VR-215 condensate receiver due to operator error, failure to drain system.

17.6.4.1. Overfilling of VR-213 with non-hazardous spill into workshop

17.6.6. High level in ET-202 ejector water tank due to operator error, failure to drain system.

17.6.6.1. Same Overfilling of VR-213 with non-hazardous spill into workshop; water tank open to

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17.6.3.1.1. Weight alarm W22308 on VR213 with operator action

17.6.5.1. Overfilling of VR-213 with non-hazardous spill into workshop

Chapter 7- 78

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No .

Guide Word

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

Causes

PARAMETER

Level

Consequence

Safeguards

atmosphere, spill to containment Less

17.7. Low Level

17.7.1. Low level in ATFE201 lubrication pot due to operator error, failure to monitor fluid level

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

17.7.1.1. Friction, potential damage to bushing; no SHE concerns

Chapter 7- 79

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

Parameter: Agitation

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No .

Guide Word

17

No

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2

PARAMETER

Agitation

Consequence

Safeguards

17.8.1. Loss of power, ATFE201 only impacted

17.8.1.1. Operational issue; no safety concern

17.8.2.1.1. Grounding and bouding of feed system and ATFE 17.8.2.1.2 Power back up through DG set 750KVA

17.8.2. Air ingress into system because vacuum system stops

17.8.2.1. No HSE consequences

17.8.2.1.2. loss of power will fail-close MOV22415 in the vacuum line from ET202 so vacuum in system will be broken by inerting lines on ATFE and VR216 before startup

Deviation 17.8. No Agitation

Causes

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 80

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

Node: (18) Charging operations in R-206 from VR-213 through pump P212. Filling of IPETCin packaging. Notes: QC test for IPETC, packaging at ambient, and final QC P & ID No. – IPETC-01-01-0200-14 Rev. 01 Parameter: Flow

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No .

Guide Word

18

More

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

18.1. More Flow

Causes

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

18.1.1. Pumping from VR-213 to R-206 with valve fully open

18.1.1.1. R-206 is polypro; No chance of static ignition as operating temperature at ambient and is below flashpoint. No SHE consequences.

18.1.2. More flow if the temperature is too high in VR213 due to operator error, not allowing enough time for cooling.

18.1.2.1. R-206 is polypro; No chance of static ignition as operating temperature at ambient and is below flashpoint. No SHE consequences

18.1.2.2. Damage to VR-213 (PP vessel), release to environment, potential for employee injury. Considered not credible as tank can withstand 100°C.

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

18.1.2.2.1High temp.(60 Deg .C) closes MOV22309 to prevent draining of IPETC in VR-213

Chapter 7- 81

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

Parameter: Temperature

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No .

Guide Word

18

More

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

18.2. Higher Temperature

Causes 18.2.1. External fire caused by spill of nearby flammable mixture & ignition

PARAMETER

Temperature

Consequence

Safeguards

18.2.1.1. Melting of R206 which is located on elevated section of 1st floor that normally could not contain pool fire.

18.2.2. insufficient cooling time in VR-214A/B - not credible to have impact on R206 since need to pass via VR213

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

18.2.1.1.1. Electrical Construction to proper classification NFPA or ATEX to prevent sources of ignition [LES2A] 18.2.1.1.2. Control of hot work

Parameter: Pressure

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No .

Guide Word

18

More

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

18.3. Higher Pressure

Causes 18.3.1. No credible scenarios with SHE consequence

PARAMETER

Pressure

Consequence

Safeguards 18.2.1.1.1. Electrical Construction to proper classification NFPA or ATEX to prevent sources of ignition [LES2A] 18.2.1.1.2. Control of hot work

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 82

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

Parameter: Level

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No .

Guide Word

18

More

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

18.5. Higher Level

Causes 18.5.1. Operator error, discharge to R-206 from VR213 before first lot is Completed

PARAMETER

Level

Consequence

Safeguards

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION High level indication and hooter to be provided

18.5.1.1. No HSE consequences as two batches quantity does not exceed capacity of R-206(5Kl)

Parameter: Agitation

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2

PARAMETER

Agitation

Consequence

Safeguards

No .

Guide Word

18

More

18.6. More Agitation

18.6.1. No credible cause

18.6.1.1 No HSE concern

Less

18.7. No agitation

18.7.1. Loss of power

18.7.1.1. No SHE concern, quality issue

Deviation

Causes

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 83

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

Node: (19) Mixing and heating of 30% SIPX solution & 10% Nickel Sulfate Hexa Hydrate solution. o Notes: Apply steam to R406 jacket, heat content up to 79-80 C. P & ID No. – IPETC-01-01-0400-09 Rev. 01 Parameter: Temperature

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No .

Guide Word

19

More

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2

PARAMETER

Temperature

Consequence

Safeguards

Deviation

Causes

19.1. Higher Temperature

19.1.1. External fire on VR201& VR400A or R406 caused by spill of nearby flammable mixture & ignition. External fire scenario for R406 system

19.1.1.1 Over pressurize system, fail vessel, injury to Employee.

19.1.1.1.1. Rupture disc RD47101 on R406 of DN100 rated at 3.0 barg / T 150°C (LRS3C)

19.1.2. Apply too high heat

19.1.2.1 Due to high temperature decomposition may raise the temperature to the auto-ignition point of the carbon disulfide decomposition product , causing spontaneous combustion.

19.1.2.1.1. Temperature controlled by TCV 47101 on steam supply interlocked with TIC47101 on reactor. 19.1.2.1.2. PRV 47102 design at 25mbarg

19.1.3. External fire for heat exchangers HE-400A & B not credible; located one level above ground on checkered plate floor that cannot contain Liquids.

19.1.2.1.3. Rupture disc RD47101 on R406 of DN100 rated at 3.0 barg / T 150°C (LRS3C)

19.1.4. Loss of cooling & Chilling water on condenser

19.1.4.1.1 PSV 40302& PSV40305 provided on HE 400A&B respectively.

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

19.1.4.1 Vapor load increase on scrubber SCR402 or may direct vent out from scrubber system.

Chapter 7- 84

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION RD size to be reviewed through HEL. PRV 47102 design at 25mbarg and it is to be connected to the scrubber system SCR-402 RD size to be reviewed through HEL.

Scrubber to be designed by considering extreme condition of increase in vapor load.

Parameter: Agitation

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No .

Guide Word

10

No

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2

Deviation 19.2. No Agitation

Causes 19.2.1. Power failure, loss of agitation

PARAMETER

Agitation

Consequence

Safeguards

19.2.1.1. No SHE consequence before adding MEA

DESIGN S

P

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

R

Back up DG set 750KVA provided

Node: (20) Once the temperature reaches to 79-80oC, start adding specified qty of 70% MEA from 70% MEA Day tank VR201/VR-400A by pump P203/P-401. 3 Notes: Charging is done with centrifugal pump P203/P401 that has max. capacity of 10 m³/H/ 2 M /hr; there is a flow meter to control charging rate and recirculation line to VR201/VR-400A. Based on this flow rate and DN40/DN25 of charging line connected to DN80/DN50, Charging line is without dip tube into R406. MEA charging done at 79 to 80°C; then maintained for 12 Hrs between 79 to 80°C by steam control valve. Note that boiling point of MEA is 38°C. During maintaining, operator uses log sheet every 30 minutes to record critical data. R406 is inerted via N2 sweep controlled by flow indicator. P & ID No. – IPETC-01-01-0400-09 Rev. 01, IPETC-01-01-0400-05 Rev.01, IPETC-01-01-0400-06 Rev.01 Parameter: Flow

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No .

Guide Word

20

More

Deviation 20.1. More Flow

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Causes 20.1.1. Operator error, charging of extra quantity of MEA or high flow MEA into R406, FQIC40122/FQIC 40112 failure by operator reset or else

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

20.1.1.1. No HSE consequences, material will loss

Chapter 7- 85

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No .

Guide Word Other Than

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2

Deviation

Causes

20.2. Misdirected Flow

20.2.1. Misdirected flow to R405 because of wrong selection of MOV

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

20.2.2.1. No SHE consequence

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

20.2.2.1.1 High level interlock with MOV 41714 20.2.2.1.2 High temperature interlock with MOV 41714

Parameter: Temperature

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No .

Guide Word

20

More

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2

Deviation 20.3. Higher Temperature

Causes 20.3.1. Excess steam on R406

PARAMETER

Temperature

Consequence

Safeguards

S

P

R

20.3.1.1. Reaction mass temperature 0 exceeds more than 90 C, CS2 & H2S will liberate from the reaction mass and it will consider a minor decomposition.

13.3.1.1.1. High temperature in R406 closes TV47101.

5

3

8

13.3.1.1.2. Scrubber SCR402 has been designed on the basis of gas liberation rate 13.3.1.1.3. High temperature alarm indication with hooter is in place. 13.3.1.1.4. RD of DN100 on R406 rated at 3.0barg and T =150°C.

20.3.2 Mislocation of temperature probe

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

20.3.2.1 Correct mass temperature may not show

Chapter 7- 86

DESIGN

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

Revalidation report on all vent sizes for al vessels and ancillary equipment. Confirm sizing for this scenario from process hazard lab.

Possibility of providing cooling media during decomposition to be checked

To be defined PM/PI program

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No .

Guide Word

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2

Deviation

Causes

20.3.2. Loss of cooling (in condenser HE400A/B)

PARAMETER

Temperature

Consequence

Safeguards

20.3.2.1. Vapor load increase on scrubber SCR402 or may direct vent out from scrubber system.

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

Pressure switch to be provided on CHWS & CWS inlet line and indication with hooter to be provided.

Revalidation report on all vent sizes for al vessels and ancillary equipment. Confirm sizing for this scenario from process hazard lab.

Scrubber to be designed by considering extreme condition of increase in vapor load. Less

20.4. Lower Temperature

20.4.1. Operator error

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

20.4.1.1. No HSE consequences

Chapter 7- 87

Parameter : Pressure

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No . 20

Guide Word More

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2

PARAMETER

Flow

Causes

Consequence

Safeguards

20.5.1 Due to decomposition of SIPX

20.5.1.1 Reaction mass temperature exceeds more than 0 90 C, CS2 & H2S will liberate from the reaction mass and it will consider a minor decomposition.

20.5.1.1.1. High temperature in R406 closes TV47101.

Deviation

20.5 High pressure

20.5.1.1.2 PIT 47101 indicate the pressure

20.5.1.1.3. Scrubber SCR402 has been designed on the basis of gas liberation rate 20.5.1.1.4. High temperature alarm indication with hooter is in place. 20.5.1.1.5. RD of DN100 on R406 rated at 3.0barg and T =150°C. 20

Less

20.6 Low pressure

20.6.1 Low N2 pressure during reaction

20.6.1.1 Oxidation of reaction mass ; No HSE consequences

20.6.1.1.1 PIT 47101 indicate and PCV 47101 controlled the N2 pressure

Node :-Sampling of IPETC forchecking pH, IPETC strength, IPA, Free SIPX and MEA content.

Notes :Refer sampling Node no. 14 of R-405 for R-406 sampling P & ID No. – IPETC-01-01-0400-09 Rev. 01

Node: Allow to separate the reaction mixture in two phases

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 88

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION Revalidation report on all vent sizes for all vessels and ancillary equipment. Confirm sizing for this scenario from process hazard lab.

Notes : After completion of 12 hrs in R-406 at 79-80oC under agitation, stop the agitator to allow for the two phases to separate for 1 hr. After phase separation, remove the solid precipitate containing Nickel sulfide from the bottom drain valve of R-406 in SS-Bucket or container and measure the qty of solid precipitate. The remaining suspended solids to be collected from the online filter system. All the collected solid precipitate will go to catalyst supplier for catalyst recycle or for disposal to external party. The aqueous Mother Liquor layer is then decanted to vessels STT-503/STT-506 via pump P-421 under close supervision. The aqueous layer is passed through Filter F-406 for trapping of solids. As soon as organic layer is seen in the bottom pipeline view glass of R-406 close the bottom valve. R406 is glass-lined MS vessel of 12.5 m3, which is inerted with N2 controlled by PCV47101. Pressure rating of R406 is 6.0barg at 220°C. Decantation by centrifugal pump P421 which has max capacity of 15 m³/Hr. at 30m head.

P & ID No. – IPETC-01-01-0400-09 Rev. 01, IPETC-01-01-0500-16 Rev.01, IPETC-01-01-0500-20 Rev.01 Parameter : Flow

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No . 21

Other than

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

Guide Word

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM Causes

21.1 Misdirected flow

21.1.1 Valve misalignment

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

21.1.1.1 Overfilling of vessel either STT-503/STT-506 and new vessel

21.1.1.1.1 LIT 56111 and LIT 56602 is in place on the vessel STT-503 and STT506 respectively

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION High alarm indication and hooter to be installed Follow SOP

Pararmeter : Pressure

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No .

Guide Word

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Causes

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

Chapter 7- 89

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No . 21

More

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

Guide Word

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM Causes

21.2 High pressure

21.2.1 High pressure in STT-503 , STT-506 and new vessel

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

DESIGN S

P

R

21.2.1.1 Not credible as vessels are open vented

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION Conservation vent to be provided over STT-503/506 N2 blanketing arrangement to be done over STT503/506.

21

Less

21.3 Low pressure

21.3.1 Pump suction or strainer or filter blocked

21.3.1.1 Not credible as transferring done at 80 Deg.C

21.3.1.1.1. Power monitor is provided on the pump P-421

Parameter :- Temperature

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No .

Guide Word

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

Causes

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

21

Less

21.4 Low temperature

21.4.1 Reaction mass temperature too low

21.4.1.1 Not credible as liquid is not having properties of formation of crystal at lower temperature

21

More

21.5 High temperature

21.5.1 Reaction mass transferring temperature at 80 Deg.C

21.5.1.1.Chances of hot burn injury

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

Insulation for safety to be provided over transferring line PPE matrix to be followed

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 90

Parameter : Other than

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No . 21

Other than

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

Guide Word

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM Causes

21.6 Incorrect material

21.6.1. Overdecantation of R-405 liquid in STT-503, STT-506 & new vessel

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

DESIGN S

P

R

21.6.1.1 Overfilling of STT-503, STT506 and new vessels

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION High level alarm indication and hooter to be installed Follow SOP

Node(22): Transfer of crude IPETC from R-406to VR-411 and VR-413 via pump P-420 Notes: The top organic phase containing crude IPETC is decanted to VR-411/VR-413 via pump P420 P & ID No. – IPETC-01-01-0400-09 Rev. 01, IPETC-01-01-0400-11 Rev.01 Parameter : Flow

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No .

Guide Word

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Causes

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

Chapter 7- 91

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No . 22

Other than

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

Guide Word

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM Causes

22.1 Misdirected flow

221.1 Pump P-421 used for organic transfer instead of P-420

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

22.1.1.1 No HSE consequences as multiple manual valve operation

Parameter: Pressure

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No . 22

More

Process steps as per Section 2.2

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

22.2.1 Vent valve closed over VR413

22.2.1.1 Over pressurization of vessels, rupture of vessel; employee injury

22.2.1.1.1 RD41414 DN50 set at 4 barg will take care for high pressure

Vent valve on VR-413 to be kept locked open

22.2.2 Human error MOV41410 closed in between VR-411 & VR413

22.2.2.1 Over pressurization of VR-411

22.2.2.1.1 RD41404 DN40 set at 4 barg will take care foe high pressure

Conservation vent need to provide on VR-411

Deviation

Guide Word

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

22.2 High pressure

Causes

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

Parameter :- Temperature

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION

Process steps as per Section 2.2

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM PARAMETER

Flow

Chapter 7- 92

DESIGN

RECOMMENDATONS/

No . 22

Deviation

Guide Word More

Causes

22.3 High temperature

22.3.1 Reaction mass transferring temperature at 80 Deg.C

Consequence

Safeguards

S

P

R

ACTION

Insulation for safety to be provided over transferring line and VR-411 & VR-413

22.3.1.1.Chances of hot burn injury

PPE matrix to be followed

Parameter : Other than

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTENSION No . 22

Other than

Process steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

Guide Word

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

22.4 Incorrect material

Causes 22.4.1. Human error; forgot to decant aqueous layer

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

22.4.1.1 Overfilling of VR-411 & VR-413

DESIGN S

22.4.1.1.1 High level interlock on VR-413 with MOV41410

P

R

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION High level alarm indication and hooter to be installed Follow SOP

Node: (23) Receiving of mother liquor in STT-503 and new tank from R-405/R-406 via pump P-418/P-421 P & ID No. – IPETC-01-01-0400-07 Rev. 01, IPETC-01-01-0400-09 Rev.01, IPETC-01-01-0500-16 Rev.01, IPETC-01-01-0500-20 Rev.01

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTERSION

Process Steps as per Section 2.2

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM PARAMETER

Flow Chapter 7- 93

DESIGN

RECOMMENDATION/

No. 23

Guide Word

Deviation

Causes

Consequence

High Temp.

23.1. High temperature in STT-503

23.1.1. External fire

23.1.1.1. Vessel failure; employee injury

High Level

23.2. High level in STT - 503

23.2.1. Forgot to transfer previous batches liquid from STT-503 to feed to Calandria 501

23.2.1.1. Overfilling of vessel STT-503; spillage on the floor

23.3.1. Operator error; malfunction of level switch

23.3.1.1. No SHE consequences; operational issue

Low level

23.3. Low level in STT503

Safeguards

S

P

ACTION

R

23.1.1.1.1. Open Vent Pipe to atmosphere on low pressure storage tank - Low fouling Potential

Conservation vent to be provided over STT-503 N2 blanketing arrangement to be done over STT-503 .

Node: (24) Mother liquor from STT-503 transfer to calendria CL-501 through the feed pump P-516 to circulation pump P-503 under vacuum & heat the solution in Calendria CL-501 . Water vapor from VS-501 is then cooled in the HE-501 & bottom liquid which is coming out from VS-501 is then recirculated back to CL-501 via pump P-503. STT-503 is SS-304 vessel of 8 m3,. Pressure rating of STT-503 is 2.0 barg at 150°C. P & ID No. – IPETC-01-01-0500-16 Rev.01, IPETC-01-01-0500-17 Rev. 01

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTERSION No. 24

Guide Word High Temp.

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process Steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

24.1. High temperature in evaporator CL-501

Causes 24.1.1. Circulation pump P-503 stopped

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

24.1.1.1. Liquid overheated in CL501;

24.1.1.1.1. Rupture disc on VS-501 will protect the vessel

Over pressurization of CL-501, vessel failure

Low

24.2. Low temperature

24.2.1. No Steam

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24.2.1.1. No SHE

24.2.1.1.1. Rupture

Chapter 7- 94

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATION/ ACTION

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTERSION No.

Guide Word Temp.

Process Steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

Causes

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

in evaporator CL-501

Supply

Consequences

24.3. High pressure in CL-501

24.3.1. Circulation pump P-503 stopped

24.3.1.1. Liquid overheated in CL- 501; Overpressurisation of CL-501, vessel failure

Low pressure

24.4. Low pressure in CL-501

24.4.1. Operator error; vacuum increased in the system

24.4.1.1. No HSE consequences

High Level

24.5. High level in VS-501

24.5.1. Mother liquor slurry transfer pump P-504 flow stopped due to blockage at the outlet of VS-501

24.5.1.1. Liquid flooding in the VS- 501, & finally goes in the vacuum pump

Low level

24.6. Low level in VS501

24.6.1. No cause identified

High pressure

24.7. High pressure in VS-501

Low pressure

24.8. Low pressure in VS-501

High pressure

24

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

24.8.1. High vacuum in the system

24.9.1. External fire

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

disc on VS-501 will protect the vessel

24.5.1.1.1 FIT 56113 will control the flow and MOV 56115 closes on high level LIT 56213 flow to VS-501

24.8.1.1. No SHE consequences; Max. vapors in the VS-501 will suck by the vacuum pump 24.9.1.1.1. RD will

Chapter 7- 95

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATION/ ACTION

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTERSION No.

Guide Word

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process Steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

High Temp.

24.9. High Temperature in VS-501

Low Temp.

24.10. Low temp. in VS501

Causes

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

24.9.1.1. Over pressurization of VS-501; rupture vessel 24.10.1. Liquid coming from CL-501 is not heated

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATION/ ACTION

R

RECOMMENDATION/ ACTION

protect the vessel VS-501 & CL-501 as both are interconnected

24.10.1.1. No SHE consequences; No vapor formation

Node: (25) Overflow liquid from side nozzle of VS-501 is then transfer to STT-504 via pump P-504 & the overflow liquid from STT504 is then transfer to STT-503 by gravity and cooled upto ambient temperature. P & ID No. – IPETC-01-01-0500-17 Rev. 01, IPETC-01-01-0500-18 Rev.01

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTERSION No. 25

Guide Word

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process Steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

Causes

PARAMETER Consequence

Low Temp.

25.1. Low temperature in tank STT-504

25.1.1. Atmospheric temp. is too low

25.1.1.1. No SHE consequences; operational issue

High Temp.

25.2. High temperature in tank STT-504

25.2.1. External fire

25.2.1.1. No SHE consequences; Vessel is open top Head

25.3. High level in STT-

25.3.1. Too much

25.3.1.1. Not credible as

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Flow Safeguards

Chapter 7- 96

DESIGN S

P

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTERSION No.

Guide Word High Level

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process Steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

504

Causes liquid transfer from VS-501 to STT-504, overflow line blockage

PARAMETER Consequence

Flow Safeguards

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATION/ ACTION

R

RECOMMENDATION/ ACTION

liquid is free flowing

Node: (26) Water vapor from VS-501 is then cooled in condenser HE-501 under vacuum of water condensed in HE-501 is then transfer to T-507 via pump P-505 through CP-501. P & ID No. – IPETC-01-01-0500-19 Rev. 01, IPETC-01-01-0500-23 Rev.01

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTERSION No. 26

Guide Word High Level

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process Steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

26.1. High level in T507

Causes 26.1.1. If water from T-507 not transferred for recycling

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

26.1.1.1. Overfilling of T-507; No HSE consequences

26.1.1.1.1. LI is provided on T-507 to avoid overfilling

Chapter 7- 97

DESIGN S

P

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTERSION No.

Guide Word High Temp.

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process Steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

26.2. High temperature in T507

Causes

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

26.2.1. Cooling water supply to condenser off

26.2.1.1. No SHE consequences; hot water from condenser will collected into T-507 & get cooled.

26.3.2. External fire

26.2.2.1. No SHE Consequences Rupture of vessel as it is HDPE; spillage of water

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATION/ ACTION

Node: (27)Packaging of concentrated aqueous Mother Liquor (ML) Product.

Notes:-Treated concentrated aqueous Mother Liquor (ML) product from STT-504 is packed to specified packaging media and sent to sale for external Customer or sent to Disposal agency. P & ID No. – IPETC-01-01-0500-18 Rev. 01

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTERSION No. 27

Guide Word High Temp.

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process Steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

27.1. High temperature in STT-504

Causes 27.1.1. Forgot to apply cooling to STT-504

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

27.1.1.1. No HSE consequences

27.1.1.1.1 Liquid collected in STT-504 through double pipe heat exchanger temp

Chapter 7- 98

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATION/ ACTION Follow SOP

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTERSION No.

Guide Word

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process Steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

Causes

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATION/ ACTION

does not goes beyond 60 Deg.C

High flow

27.2 High flow of liquid draining from STT-504 to packaging

27.1.2. External fire

27.1.2.1. No chances Of Over pressurization as tank STT-504, is open to atmosphere vessel

27.2.1. Human error; operator forgot to close the draining valve

27.2.1.1. Spill or splash of liquid on operator body

27.2.1.1.1 PPE matrix and appropriate PPE available

Node: (28) Water collected in the tank T-507 is check for pH, TDS or any organic content, if it is cleared by QA/QC then it is recycled back in process via pump P516. P & ID No. – IPETC-01-01-0500-23 Rev. 01, IPETC-01-01-0400-01 Rev.01

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 99

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTERSION No. 28

Guide Word

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process Steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

Causes

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

High Level

28.1. High level in T507

28.1.1. Previous batches water is not recycled from T- 507 to S403

28.1.1.1. No SHE consequences

Low level

28.2. Low level in T507

28.2.1. Low level in the tank T-507 as full water transferred to S-403

28.2.1.1. No SHE Consequences

High Temp.

28.3. High temperature in T-507

28.3.1. External fire

DESIGN S

P

28.1.1.1.1. Tank capacity is 25Kl it will take the volume of 4 batches at a time

. 28.3.1.1.1 HDPE tank get collapse& water get release surrounding area.

Node: (29) Receiving of mother liquor in STT-506 and new tank from R-405/R-406 via pump P-418/P-421 P & ID No. – IPETC-01-01-0400-07 Rev. 01, IPETC-01-01-0400-09 Rev.01, IPETC-01-01-0500-20 Rev.01

HAZOP STUDY

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Chapter 7- 100

R

RECOMMENDATION/ ACTION

DESIGN INTERSION No. 29

Guide Word

Process Steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

Causes

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

High Temp.

29.1. High temperature in STT-506

29.1.1. External fire

29.1.1.1. Vessel failure; employee injury

High Level

29.2. High level in STT - 506

29.2.1. Forgot to transfer previous batches liquid from STT-506 to feed to Calandria 502

29.2.1.1. Overfilling of vessel STT-506; spillage on the floor

29.3.1. Operator error; malfunction of level switch

29.3.1.1. No SHE consequences; operational issue

Low level

29.3. Low level in STT506

29.1.1.1.1. Open Vent Pipe to atmosphere on low pressure storage tank - Low fouling Potential

DESIGN S

P

RECOMMENDATION/ ACTION

R

.Conservation vent to be provided over STT-506 N2 blanketing arrangement to be done over STT-506 .

Node: (30) Mother liquor from STT-506 transfer to calendria CL-502 through the feed pump P-519 to circulation pump P-508 under vacuum & heat the solution in Calendria CL-502 . Water vapor from VS-502 is then cooled in the HE-502 & bottom liquid which is coming out from VS-502 is then recirculated back to CL-502 via pump P-508. STT-506 is SS-304 vessel of 17 m3,. Pressure rating of STT-506 is 2.0 barg at 150°C. P & ID No. – IPETC-01-01-0500-20 Rev. 01, IPETC-01-01-0500-21 Rev.01

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 101

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTERSION No. 30

Guide Word High Temp.

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process Steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

30.1. High temperature in evaporator CL-502

Causes 30.1.1. Circulation pump P-508 stopped

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

30.1.1.1. Liquid overheated in CL502;

30.1.1.1.1. Rupture disc on VS-502 will protect the vessel 30.2.1.1.1. Rupture disc on VS-502 will protect the vessel

Over pressurization of CL-501, vessel failure

Low Temp.

30.2. Low temperature in evaporator CL-502

30.2.1. No Steam Supply

30.2.1.1. No SHE Consequences

30.3. High pressure in CL-502

30.3.1. Circulation pump P-509 stopped

30.3.1.1. Liquid overheated in CL- 502; Over pressurization of CL-502, vessel failure

Low pressure

30.4. Low pressure in CL-502

30.4.1. Operator error; vacuum increased in the system

30.4.1.1. No HSE consequences

High Level

30.5. High level in VS-502

30.5.1. Mother liquor slurry transfer pump P-509 flow stopped due to blockage at the outlet of VS-502

30.5.1.1. Liquid flooding in the VS- 502, & finally goes in the vacuum pump

Low level

30.6. Low level in VS502

High pressure

30.7. High pressure in VS-502

High pressure

30

30.6.1. No cause identified

30.5.1.1.1 FIT 56603 will control the flow and MOV 56607 closes on high level LIT 56716 flow to VS-502

30.8.1. High vacuum in

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 102

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATION/ ACTION

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTERSION No.

Guide Word

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process Steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

Causes

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATION/ ACTION

System is designed for low pressure

Low pressure

30.8. Low pressure in VS-502

the system

30.8.1.1. No SHE consequences; Max. vapors in the VS-502 will suck by the vacuum pump

High Temp.

30.9. High Temperature in VS-502

30.9.1. External fire

30.9.1.1. Over pressurization of VS-502; rupture vessel

Low Temp.

30.10. Low temp. in VS502

30.10.1. Liquid coming from CL-502 is not heated

30.10.1.1. No SHE consequences; No vapor formation

30.9.1.1.1. RD will protect the vessel VS-502 & CL-502 as both are interconnected

Node: (31) Overflow liquid from side nozzle of VS-502 is then transfer to STT-507 via pump P-509 & the overflow liquid from STT507 is then transfer to STT-506 by gravity and cooled upto ambient temperature. P & ID No. – IPETC-01-01-0500-21 Rev. 01, IPETC-01-01-0500-22 Rev.01

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTERSION

Process Steps as per Section 2.2

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM PARAMETER

Flow

Chapter 7- 103

DESIGN

RECOMMENDATION/

No. 31

Guide Word

Deviation

Causes

Consequence

Low Temp.

31.1. Low temperature in tank STT-506

31.1.1. Atmospheric temp. is too low

31.1.1.1. No SHE consequences;

High Temp.

31.2. High temperature in tank STT-506

31.2.1. External fire

31.2.1.1. No SHE consequences; Vessel is open top Head

High Level

31.3. High level in STT506

31.3.1. Too much liquid transfer from VS-502 to STT-507 overflow line blockage

31.3.1.1. Not credible as liquid is free flowing

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Safeguards

Chapter 7- 104

S

P

R

ACTION

Node: (32) Water vapor from VS-502 is then cooled in condenser HE-502 under vacuum of water condensed in HE-502 is then transfer to T-507 via pump P-510 through CP-502. P & ID No. – IPETC-01-01-0500-21 Rev. 01, IPETC-01-01-0500-23 Rev.01

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTERSION No. 32

Guide Word

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process Steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

Causes

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

High Level

32.1. High level in T507

32.1.1. If water from T-507 not transferred for recycling

32.1.1.1. Overfilling of T-507; No HSE consequences

High Temp.

32.2. High temperature in T507

32.2.1. Cooling water supply to condenser off

32.2.1.1. No SHE consequences; hot water from condenser will collected into T-507 & get cooled.

32.2.2. External fire

32.2.2.1. No SHE Consequences Rupture of vessel as it is HDPE; spillage of water

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

32.1.1.1.1. LI is provided on T-507 to avoid overfilling

Chapter 7- 105

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATION/ ACTION

Node: (33)Packaging of concentrated aqueous Mother Liquor (ML) Product.

Notes:-Treated concentrated aqueous Mother Liquor (ML) product from STT-507 is packed to specified packaging media and sent to sale for external Customer or sent to Disposal agency. P & ID No. – IPETC-01-01-0500-22 Rev. 01

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTERSION No. 33

Guide Word High Temp.

High flow

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process Steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

33.1. High temperature in STT-507

33.2 High flow of liquid draining from STT-507 to packaging

Causes

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

33.1.1. Forgot to apply cooling to STT-507

33.1.1.1. No HSE consequences

33.1.2. External fire

33.1.2.1. No chances Of Over pressurization as tank STT-507, is open to atmosphere vessel

33.2.1. Human error; operator forgot to close the draining valve

33.2.1.1. Spill or splash of liquid on operator body

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

33.1.1.1.1 Liquid collected in STT-507 through double pipe heat exchanger temp does not goes beyond 60 Deg.C

33.2.1.1.1 PPE matrix and appropriate PPE available

Chapter 7- 106

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATION/ ACTION Follow SOP

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTERSION No.

Guide Word

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process Steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

Causes

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATION/ ACTION

Node: (34) Water collected in the tank T-507 is check for pH, TDS or any organic content, if it is cleared by QA/QC then it is recycled back in process via pump P516 to S-403. P & ID No. – IPETC-01-01-0500-23 Rev. 01, IPETC-01-01-0400-01 Rev.01

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTERSION No. 34

Guide Word

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process Steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

Causes

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

High Level

34.1. High level in T507

34.1.1. Previous batches water is not recycled from T- 507 to S403

34.1.1.1. No SHE consequences

Low level

34.2. Low level in T507

34.2.1. Low level in the tank T-507 as full water transferred to S-403

34.2.1.1. No SHE Consequences

34.3. High temperature in T-507

34.3.1. External fire

High Temp.

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

34.1.1.1.1. Tank capacity is 25Kl it will take the volume of 4 batches at a time

. 34.3.1.1.1 HDPE tank get collapse& water get release surrounding area.

Chapter 7- 107

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATION/ ACTION

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTERSION No.

Guide Word

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process Steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

Causes

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATION/ ACTION

Node: (35) Warm collected condensed water in the tank T-505 is then transferred through HE-503 chiller via pump P-512 for vacuum pump VP-513sealant cooling; hot sealant water is then collected in UGT-506 & transferred from there to T-505 via pump P-512. Vacuum is applied to thesystem via vacuum pump VP513 through vacuum trap VT-513. P & ID No. – A5FP-25-25-0500-65 Rev. 04

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTERSION No. 35

Guide Word High flow

Low level

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process Steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

Causes

35.1. High flow from P-512

35.1.1. No SHE Consequence

35.2. High flow vapour from VT-512.

35.2.1. High vapor flow from HE 501 (See 27.23.1 )

35.3. Low flow from P-512.

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

35.2.2. Air ingress due to leak or vacuum pump failure.

35.2.2.1. NO SHE consequence.

35.3.1. Low level or no level in T-505

35.3.1.1. No SHE consequence but its Operational problem.

35.3.2. P-512 not working properly or

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 108

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATION/ ACTION

HAZOP STUDY DESIGN INTERSION No.

Guide Word High Temp. Low Temp.

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM

Process Steps as per Section 2.2 Deviation

Causes

PARAMETER

Flow

Consequence

Safeguards

cavitation. 35.4. High Temperature in T-505.

35. 4.1. See 27.3.

35.5. Low Temperature in T-505.

35.5.1. No SHE consequence.

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 109

DESIGN S

P

R

RECOMMENDATION/ ACTION

Annexure – 7.2 CHEMICAL DATA: Chemical Name: ETHYLAMINE

Molecular Weight: 45.08 g/mol

AEGL-1 (60 min): 7.5 ppm AEGL-2 (60 min): 49 ppm AEGL-3 (60 min): 270 ppm IDLH: 600 ppm

LEL: 27000 ppm

UEL: 140000 ppm

Ambient Boiling Point: 14.5° C Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atm Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0%

ATMOSPHERIC DATA: (MANUAL INPUT OF DATA) Wind: 1.8 meters/second from NE at 3 meters Ground Roughness: open country Air Temperature: 25° C No Inversion Height

Cloud Cover: 5 tenths Stability Class: B

Relative Humidity: 55%

Scenario - 1 SOURCE STRENGTH: Direct Source: 2150 liters

Source Height: 0

Source State: Liquid Source Temperature: equal to ambient Release Duration: 1 minute Release Rate: 24.2 kilograms/sec Total Amount Released: 1,454 kilograms Note: This chemical may flash boil and/or result in two phase flow.

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 110

THREAT ZONE: Model Run: Heavy Gas Red : 1.1 kilometers --- (270 ppm = AEGL-3 [60 min]) Orange: 2.0 kilometers --- (49 ppm = AEGL-2 [60 min]) Yellow: 3.7 kilometers --- (7.5 ppm = AEGL-1 [60 min])

kilometers 3

1

wind 0

1

3

0

2

2

4

6

kilometers greaterthan270ppm(A EGL-3[60min]) greaterthan49ppm(AEGL-2[60min]) greaterthan7.5ppm(AEGL-1[60min]) winddirectionconfidencelines

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 111

Scenario - 2 SOURCE STRENGTH: Direct Source: 2150 liters

Source Height: 0

Source State: Liquid Source Temperature: equal to ambient Release Duration: 1 minute Release Rate: 24.2 kilograms/sec Total Amount Released: 1,454 kilograms Note: This chemical may flash boil and/or result in two phase flow.

THREAT ZONE: Threat Modeled: Flammable Area of Vapor Cloud Model Run: Heavy Gas Red : 136 meters --- (16200 ppm = 60% LEL = Flame Pockets) Yellow: 383 meters --- (2700 ppm = 10% LEL)

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 112

meters 300

100

wind 0

100

300

200

0

200

400

600

meters

greaterthan16200ppm(60%LEL=FlamePockets) greaterthan2700ppm(10%LEL) winddirectionconfidencelines

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 113

Scenario – 3 SOURCE STRENGTH: Direct Source: 2150 liters

Source Height: 0

Source State: Liquid Source Temperature: equal to ambient Release Duration: 1 minute Release Rate: 24.2 kilograms/sec Total Amount Released: 1,454 kilograms Note: This chemical may flash boil and/or result in two phase flow.

THREAT ZONE: Threat Modeled: Overpressure (blast force) from vapor cloud explosion Type of Ignition: ignited by spark or flame Level of Congestion: congested Model Run: Heavy Gas Red : LOC was never exceeded --- (8.0 psi = destruction of buildings) Orange: 106 meters --- (3.5 psi = serious injury likely) Yellow: 154 meters --- (1.0 psi = shatters glass)

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 114

m eters 150

50

wind

0

50

150

100

0

100

200

300

m eters greaterthan8.0psi(destructionofbuildings) greaterthan3.5psi(seriousinjurylikely) greaterthan1.0psi(shattersglass) winddirectionconfidencelines

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 115

Scenario – 4 SOURCE STRENGTH: Leak from hole in vertical cylindrical tank Flammable chemical escaping from tank (not burning) Tank Diameter: 1.7 meters

Tank Length: 2.8 meters

Tank Volume: 6.36 cubic meters Tank contains liquid

Internal Temperature: 25° C

Chemical Mass in Tank: 4.48 tons

Tank is 94% full

Circular Opening Diameter: 0.5 centimeters Opening is 1 centimeters from tank bottom Release Duration: ALOHA limited the duration to 1 hour Max Average Sustained Release Rate: 6.72 kilograms/min (averaged over a minute or more) Total Amount Released: 401 kilograms Note: The chemical escaped as a mixture of gas and aerosol (two phase flow).

THREAT ZONE: Model Run: Heavy Gas Red : 91 meters --- (270 ppm = AEGL-3 [60 min]) Orange: 226 meters --- (49 ppm = AEGL-2 [60 min]) Yellow: 606 meters --- (7.5 ppm = AEGL-1 [60 min])

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 116

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 117

Scenario – 5 SOURCE STRENGTH: Leak from hole in vertical cylindrical tank Flammable chemical escaping from tank (not burning) Tank Diameter: 1.7 meters

Tank Length: 2.8 meters

Tank Volume: 6.36 cubic meters Tank contains liquid

Internal Temperature: 25° C

Chemical Mass in Tank: 4.48 tons

Tank is 94% full

Circular Opening Diameter: 0.5 centimeters Opening is 1 centimeters from tank bottom Release Duration: ALOHA limited the duration to 1 hour Max Average Sustained Release Rate: 6.72 kilograms/min (averaged over a minute or more) Total Amount Released: 401 kilograms Note: The chemical escaped as a mixture of gas and aerosol (two phase flow).

THREAT ZONE: Threat Modeled: Flammable Area of Vapor Cloud Model Run: Heavy Gas Red : 11 meters --- (16200 ppm = 60% LEL = Flame Pockets) Note: Threat zone was not drawn because effects of near-field patchiness make dispersion predictions less reliable for short distances. Yellow: 22 meters --- (2700 ppm = 10% LEL) Note: Threat zone was not drawn because effects of near-field patchiness

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 118

make dispersion predictions less reliable for short distances.

Scenario – 6 SOURCE STRENGTH: Leak from hole in vertical cylindrical tank Flammable chemical escaping from tank (not burning) Tank Diameter: 1.7 meters

Tank Length: 2.8 meters

Tank Volume: 6.36 cubic meters Tank contains liquid

Internal Temperature: 25° C

Chemical Mass in Tank: 4.48 tons

Tank is 94% full

Circular Opening Diameter: 0.5 centimeters Opening is 1 centimeters from tank bottom Release Duration: ALOHA limited the duration to 1 hour Max Average Sustained Release Rate: 6.72 kilograms/min (averaged over a minute or more) Total Amount Released: 401 kilograms Note: The chemical escaped as a mixture of gas and aerosol (two phase flow).

THREAT ZONE: Threat Modeled: Overpressure (blast force) from vapor cloud explosion Type of Ignition: ignited by spark or flame Level of Congestion: congested Model Run: Heavy Gas Red : LOC was never exceeded --- (8.0 psi = destruction of buildings)

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 119

Orange: 15 meters --- (3.5 psi = serious injury likely) Yellow: 33 meters --- (1.0 psi = shatters glass)

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 120

Annexure: 7.3 DOW INDEX

Table No. 7.3.1 List of Raw Materials Stored in Drums in PESO Area Sr. No. 1

Raw Materials

Quantity

Toluene

6 Tones

2

Escaid - D80

1 Ton

3

Solvent- TXIB

10Tones

4

Methanol

1 Ton

5

LDO

4.0 Tones

6

HSD

1.0 Ton

7

Mono Ethyl Amine

1.39 Tones

No. Drums/Tanks 30.0 Drums (200 Kg X20) 5.0 Drum (200 Kg X 5) 50 Drums (200 Kg X50)

Of Flash Point 4.40C 750C 1360C

40 Cans (200 Kg X 10) 20 Drums (200 Kg X 20) 5 Drums (200 Kg X 5) 9 Drums (160 kg x 9 drums)

110C 660C 320C < 17.90C

The DOW Index is performed for all the raw materials augmenting to a total capacity of 24.39 Tones. Considering a worst case scenario all the raw materials the DOW Index is performed for Mono Ethyl Amine as the fire hazard i.e. Nf = 4 and it has the least flash point of < 17.90C 1. Mono Ethyl Amine Tank No.

--

Basic Material for Material factor

Equipment Name Mono Ethyl Amine

Properties of material Nh 3 Nf Boil. pt. 62 0F

Mono Ethyl Amine storage drums ( 24.39 Tones) Density, kg/l 0.79

4 Nr 0 16.66 0C Flash pt. -BTU / lb ∆HC = Heat of Comb. 16300 Quantity of the material 30873 l 24390 kg

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

M.F. 0F

21 < 17.9

53770

0C Lb

Chapter 7- 121

Storage conditions

1.General

2.Special

Temp

25

0C

Pressure 1.0 Penalty factor range Process Base Factor 1.00 Exothermic Chemical Reaction 0.30 to 1.25 Endothermic Processes 0.20 to 0.40 Material handling and transfer 0.25 to 1.05 Enclosed or Indoor Process Units 0.25 to 0.90 Access 0.20 to 0.35 Drainage and Spill Control 0.25 to 0.50 General Process Hazard Factor ( F1 )

Bar Penalty factor used

Process Base Factor Toxic material(s) Sub atmospheric pressure (< 500 mm Operation in or near flammable range

1.00 0.60 0.00

1.00 0.20 to 0.80 0.50 0.00 to 0.80

inerted noninerted 1. Tank farm storage flammable 0.50 2. Process upset or purge failure 0.30 3. Always in contact of Flame 0.80 Dust Explosion Pressure Operating pressure

8.7x10

9

Process Unit Hazard Factor ( F3 = F1 x F2) Fire & Explosion Index (F.& E.I.= F3 x M.F. ) Degree of Hazard

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

0.00 0.00 0.00

0.25 to 2.00

0.00 0.00

0.20 to 0.30

0.00

psig

Low temperature Quantity of flammable / unstable 1. Liquids or gases in process 2. Liquids or gases in storage 3. Combustible Solids in Storage, Dust in Process Corrosion & Erosion Leakage - Joints & Packing Use of Fired Equipment Hot oil heat exchange system Rotating Equipment Special Process Hazard Factor ( F2 )

1.00 0.00 0.00 0.85 0.00 0.00 0.50 2.35

0.00 0.80 0.00 0.10 to 0.75 0.10 to 1.50 0.15 to 1.15 0.50

0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.50 5.875 123.375

Intermediate

Chapter 7- 122

Degree of Hazard for F & EI Degree of Hazard for F & EI F & EI Index Range 1-60 61-96 97-127 128-158 159-up

Degree of Hazard Light Moderate Intermediate Heavy Severe

RECOMMENDED MINIMUM FEATURES ACCORDING TO DOW FIRE AND EXPLOSION INDEX Preventive & Protective Features

Fire & Explosion Index Number 0-20

20-40

40-60

60-75

Index for the present case 75-90

>90

123.375 Feature optional

1

2

2

3

4

4

Feature required √

1 1 1

2 2 1

3 3 2

3 3 2

4 4 2

4 4 4

√ √ √

1 1 1

2 2 2

3 3 3

3 3 4

4 3 4

4 4 4

√ √ √

4) Dust, blowdown, spill control

1

1

2

3

3

4



5) Internal examination

1

2

3

3

4

4



1 1

1 1

2 2

3 2

3 3

4 4

√ √

1

1

2

3

3

4



1) Fireproofing

Suggested

Recomme nded

2) Water spray a) directional b) area c) curtain 3) Special instrumentation a) temperature b) pressure c) flow control

6) Combustible gas monitors a) signal alarm b) actuate equipment 7) Remote operation

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 123

8) Diking, (Not Applicable as barrel storage)

1

4

4

4

4

4



9) Blast & barrier walls 1 1 2 3 4 4 separation Feature optional 2) Feature suggested 3) Feature recommended 4) Feature required

Table No. 7.3.2 List of Flammable Raw Materials Stored in ware house. Sr. No. 1 2 3 4 5 6

Raw Materials

Quantity

Para Formaldehyde (96%) Hydroxylamine Sulphate ( 98%) Sodium Carbonate (98%)

10 Tones

Magnesium oxide (80%) Caustic Lye ( 20%)

1 Ton

10 Tones 5 Tones

1000 litres 1 IBC 2679 kg

8

Sodium Isopropyl Xanthate (SIPX) Nickel Sulfate HexaHydrate Polymer 1

9

Polymer 2

60 MT

10

NaOH

5 MT

11

NH4OH

5 MT

7

76 kg 30 MT

No. Of Flash Point Drums/Tanks 400 Bags 710C (25 kg X 400) 400 Bags N.A (25 kg X 400) 200 Bags N.A (25 kg X 200) 40 Bags (25 Kg X 40 bags) 1 IBC

N.A

6 bags ( 500 kgs x 6 nos.) 3 bags ( 25 kgs x 3 nos) 1200 bags ( 1200 x 25 kgs) 2400 bags ( 2400 x 25 kgs) 200 bags ( 200 x 25 kgs) --

N.A

N.A.

N.A. N.A N.A N.A N.A

The DOW Index is performed for p-Formaldehyde augmenting to a total capacity of 10 Tones. Other chemicals are salts which are not flammable. Thus DOW Index is only performed Para Formaldehyde.

2. Para Formaldehyde

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 124

Tank No.

--

Equipment Name

Basic Material for Material factor Properties of material Nh 3 Nf Boil. pt. -0F

1 --

∆HC = Heat of Comb. -Quantity of the material Storage conditions Temp

1.General

2.Special

-

0C BTU / lb l 25

Para Formaldehyde 400 Bags (25 kg X 400)

Density, kg/l Nr 0 Flash pt.

159

M.F. 0F

-4 71

1000 0C

0C

kg 2204 Pressure 1.0 Penalty factor range Process Base Factor 1.00 Exothermic Chemical Reaction 0.30 to 1.25 Endothermic Processes 0.20 to 0.40 Material handling and transfer 0.25 to 1.05 Enclosed or Indoor Process Units 0.25 to 0.90 Access 0.20 to 0.35 Drainage and Spill Control 0.25 to 0.50 General Process Hazard Factor ( F1 )

Lb Bar Penalty factor used

Process Base Factor Toxic material(s) Sub atmospheric pressure (< 500 mm Operation in or near flammable range

1.00 0.60 0.00

1.00 0.20 to 0.80 0.50 0.00 to 0.80

inerted noninerted 1. Tank farm storage flammable 0.50 2. Process upset or purge failure 0.30 3. Always in contact of Flame 0.80 Dust Explosion Pressure Operating pressure

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

0.00 0.00 0.00

0.25 to 2.00

0.00 0.00

0.20 to 0.30

0.00

psig

Low temperature Quantity of flammable / unstable 1. Liquids or gases in process 2. Liquids or gases in storage 3. Combustible Solids in Storage, Dust in Process Corrosion & Erosion Leakage - Joints & Packing Use of Fired Equipment Hot oil heat exchange system Rotating Equipment

1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00

0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 to 0.75 0.10 to 1.50 0.15 to 1.15 0.50

0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

Chapter 7- 125

Special Process Hazard Factor ( F2 )

1.7

Process Unit Hazard Factor ( F3 = F1 x F2) Fire & Explosion Index (F.& E.I.= F3 x M.F. ) Degree of Hazard

1.7 6.8 Light

Degree of Hazard for F & EI Degree of Hazard for F & EI F & EI Index Range 1-60 61-96 97-127 128-158 159-up

Degree of Hazard Light Moderate Intermediate Heavy Severe

RECOMMENDED MINIMUM FEATURES ACCORDING TO DOW FIRE AND EXPLOSION INDEX Preventive & Protective Features

Fire & Explosion Index Number 0-20

20-40

40-60

60-75

Index for the present case 75-90

>90

1

2

2

3

4

4

6.8 Feature optional √

1 1 1

2 2 1

3 3 2

3 3 2

4 4 2

4 4 4

√ √ √

1 1 1

2 2 2

3 3 3

3 3 4

4 3 4

4 4 4

√ √ √

4) Dust, blowdown, spill control

1

1

2

3

3

4



5) Internal examination

1

2

3

3

4

4



1 1

1 1

2 2

3 2

3 3

4 4

√ √

1) Fireproofing

Suggested

Recomme nded

Feature required

2) Water spray a) directional b) area c) curtain 3) Special instrumentation a) temperature b) pressure c) flow control

6) Combustible gas monitors a) signal alarm b) actuate equipment

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 126

7) Remote operation

1

1

2

3

3

4

8) Diking, (Not Applicable as barrel storage)

1

4

4

4

4

4



9) Blast & barrier walls 1 1 2 3 4 4 √ separation 1) Feature optional 2) Feature suggested 3) Feature recommended 4) Feature required

3. Magnesium Metal Sr. No. 1

Raw Materials

Quantity

Magnesium Metal

2 Tones

Tank No. -Basic Material for Material factor Properties of material Nh 0 Nf 1 Boil. pt. 2025 0F 1107.2 10600 ∆HC = Heat of Comb. Quantity of the material Storage conditions Temp

14

0C BTU / lb

No. Of Flash Point Drums/Tanks 80 Bags -(25 kg X 400)

Equipment Name Magnesium Metal (2 T, 80 bags) Density, kg/l -Nr 1 Flash pt.

25

2000 0C

--

14 --

kg 4409.25 Pressure 1.0 Penalty factor range 1.00 0.30 to 1.25 0.20 to 0.40 0.25 to 1.05 0.25 to 0.90 0.20 to 0.35 0.25 to 0.50

1.General

Process Base Factor Exothermic Chemical Reaction Endothermic Processes Material handling and transfer Enclosed or Indoor Process Units Access Drainage and Spill Control General Process Hazard Factor ( F1 )

2.Special

Process Base Factor Toxic material(s) Sub atmospheric pressure (< 500 mm Hg) Operation in or near flammable range inerted noninerted 1. Tank farm storage flammable liquids 2. Process upset or purge failure 3. Always in contact of Flame process Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

M.F. 0F

0C Lb Bar Penalty factor used 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00

1.00 0.20 to 0.80 0.50 0.00 to 0.80

1.00 0.00 0.00

0.50 0.30 0.80

0.00 0.00 0.00

Chapter 7- 127

Dust Explosion Pressure Operating pressure psig Relief setting ________ psig Low temperature Quantity of flammable / unstable material 1. Liquids or gases in process 2. Liquids or gases in storage 3. Combustible Solids in Storage, Dust in Process Corrosion & Erosion Leakage - Joints & Packing Use of Fired Equipment Hot oil heat exchange system Rotating Equipment Special Process Hazard Factor ( F2 ) Process Unit Hazard Factor ( F3 = F1 x F2) Fire & Explosion Index (F.& E.I.= F3 x M.F. ) Degree of Hazard

0.25 to 2.00

0.00 0.00

0.20 to 0.30

0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10

0.10 to 0.75 0.10 to 1.50 0.15 to 1.15 0.50

0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.1 1.1 15.4

Light

Degree of Hazard for F & EI Degree of Hazard for F & EI F & EI Index Range 1-60 61-96 97-127 128-158 159-up

Degree of Hazard Light Moderate Intermediate Heavy Severe

RECOMMENDED MINIMUM FEATURES ACCORDING TO DOW FIRE AND EXPLOSION INDEX Preventive & Protective Features

Fire & Explosion Index Number 0-20

1) Fireproofing

20-40

40-60

60-75

Index for the present case 75-90

>90

1

2

2

3

4

4

15.4 Feature optional √

1 1 1

2 2 1

3 3 2

3 3 2

4 4 2

4 4 4

√ √ √

1 1

2 2

3 3

3 3

4 3

4 4

√ √

Suggested

Recomme nded

Feature required

2) Water spray a) directional b) area c) curtain 3) Special instrumentation a) temperature b) pressure

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 128

1

2

3

4

4

4



4) Dust, blowdown, spill control

1

1

2

3

3

4



5) Internal examination

1

2

3

3

4

4

1 1

1 1

2 2

3 2

3 3

4 4

√ √

7) Remote operation

1

1

2

3

3

4



8) Diking, (Not Applicable as barrel storage)

1

4

4

4

4

4

c) flow control



6) Combustible gas monitors a) signal alarm b) actuate equipment

9) Blast & barrier walls 1 1 2 3 4 4 separation 1)Feature optional 2) Feature suggested 3) Feature recommended 4) Feature required

Annexure: 7.4 TOXICITY INDEX (MONDS INDEX) Methodology:

Toxicity Index

: Th + Ts (1+GPH+SPH) 100

Where,

SPH

= Special Process Hazard

GPH = General Process Hazard Th

= Toxicity factor based on the NFPA hazard index (0 – 4)

Ts

= Correction factor (additional penalty) for toxicity based on Maximum Allowable Concentration (MAC) value in ppm

Th (Toxicity Factor): For p- Formaldehyde will be 250 from the table no. 6.6 as the Nh factor for p-formaldehyde is 3 Ts (Correction Factor): For p-Formaldehyde will be 125 from the table no. 6.7 as the MAC is 5 ppm Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 129

Table No. Toxicity factor Index NFPA Index Number

Toxicity Factor (Th)

0

0

1

50

2

125

3

250

4

325

Table : Correction factor for Toxicity MAC (in ppm)

Ts

5 and below

125

Between 5 and 50

75

50 and more

50

Table Toxicity Index The resulting TI values are ranked into three categories: 1-5 Light 6-9 Moderate 10-up High

1) Monds Index of p-Formaldehyde

General & Special Process Hazard 1.General

Process Base Factor Exothermic Chemical Reaction Endothermic Processes Material handling and transfer Enclosed or Indoor Process Units Access Drainage and Spill Control Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

1.00 0.30 to 1.25 0.20 to 0.40 0.25 to 1.05 0.25 to 0.90 0.20 to 0.35 0.25 to 0.50

1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Chapter 7- 130

General Process Hazard Factor ( F1 ) 2.Special

Process Base Factor Toxic material(s) Sub atmospheric pressure (< 500 mm Operation in or near flammable range

1.00 1.00 0.20 to 0.80 0.50 0.00 to 0.80

_____inerted ______noninerted 1. Tank farm storage flammable 0.50 2. Process upset or purge failure 0.30 3. Always in Flammable range 0.80 Dust Explosion Pressure Operating pressure

0.0 0.00 0.00

0.25 to 2.00

0.00 0.00

0.20 to 0.30

0.00

psig

Low temperature Quantity of flammable / unstable 1. Liquids or gases in process 2. Liquids or gases in storage 3. Combustible Solids in Storage, Dust in Process Corrosion & Erosion Leakage - Joints & Packing Use of Fired Equipment Hot oil heat exchange system Rotating Equipment Special Process Hazard Factor ( F2 )

1.00 0.6 0.00

0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 to 0.75 0.10 to 1.50 0.15 to 1.15 0.50

0.10 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.7

Therefore from the above table the GPH and SPH is coming to be around 1.00 and 1.9 respectively. Calculation of Toxicity Index: Toxicity Index

: Th + Ts (1+GPH+SPH) 100

Toxicity Index

: [250 + 125 (1 + 1.00 + 1.7)]/100

Toxicity Index

: 7.12

The Toxicity Index for p-Formaldehyde is calculated to be around 7.12 which indicate that the degree of hazard is moderate from table no. 7.23

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 131

2) Monds Index of Mono Ethyl Amine.

General & Special Process Hazard 1.General

Process Base Factor Exothermic Chemical Reaction Endothermic Processes Material handling and transfer Enclosed or Indoor Process Units Access Drainage and Spill Control General Process Hazard Factor ( F1 )

1.00 0.30 to 1.25 0.20 to 0.40 0.25 to 1.05 0.25 to 0.90 0.20 to 0.35 0.25 to 0.50

1.00 0.00 0.00 0.85 0.00 0.00 0.50 2.35

2.Special

Process Base Factor Toxic material(s) Sub atmospheric pressure (< 500 mm Operation in or near flammable range

1.00 0.20 to 0.80 0.50 0.00 to 0.80

1.00 0.60 0.00

_____inerted ______noninerted 1. Tank farm storage flammable 0.50 2. Process upset or purge failure 0.30 3. Always in Flammable range 0.80 Dust Explosion Pressure Operating pressure

0.63 x 10

9

0.25 to 2.00

0.00 0.00

0.20 to 0.30

0.00

psig

Low temperature Quantity of flammable / unstable 1. Liquids or gases in process 2. Liquids or gases in storage 3. Combustible Solids in Storage, Dust in Process Corrosion & Erosion Leakage - Joints & Packing Use of Fired Equipment Hot oil heat exchange system Rotating Equipment Special Process Hazard Factor ( F2 )

0.00 0.00 0.00

0.00 0.33 0.00 0.10 to 0.75 0.10 to 1.50 0.15 to 1.15 0.50

0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.03

Therefore from the above table the GPH and SPH is coming to be around 2.35 and 2.03 respectively. Calculation of Toxicity Index:

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 132

Toxicity Index

: Th + Ts (1+GPH+SPH) 100

Toxicity Index

: [250 + 75 (1 + 2.35 + 2.03)]/100

Toxicity Index

: 6.535

The Toxicity Index for Mono Ethyl Amine is calculated to be around 6.535 which indicate that the degree of hazard is moderate from table no. 7.23 3) Monds Index of Sulphuric acid

General & Special Process Hazard 1.General

Process Base Factor Exothermic Chemical Reaction Endothermic Processes Material handling and transfer Enclosed or Indoor Process Units Access Drainage and Spill Control General Process Hazard Factor ( F1 )

1.00 0.30 to 1.25 0.20 to 0.40 0.25 to 1.05 0.25 to 0.90 0.20 to 0.35 0.25 to 0.50

1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00

2.Special

Process Base Factor Toxic material(s) Sub atmospheric pressure (< 500 mm Operation in or near flammable range

1.00 0.20 to 0.80 0.50 0.00 to 0.80

1.00 0.6 0.00

_____inerted ______noninerted 1. Tank farm storage flammable 0.50 2. Process upset or purge failure 0.30 3. Always in Flammable range 0.80 Dust Explosion Pressure Operating pressure

0.0 0.00 0.00

0.25 to 2.00

0.00 0.00

Low temperature 0.20 to 0.30 Quantity of flammable / unstable 1. Liquids or gases in process 2. Liquids or gases in storage 3. Combustible Solids in Storage, Dust in Process Corrosion & Erosion 0.10 to 0.75 Leakage - Joints & Packing 0.10 to 1.50

0.00

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

psig

0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.10

Chapter 7- 133

Use of Fired Equipment Hot oil heat exchange system Rotating Equipment Special Process Hazard Factor ( F2 )

0.15 to 1.15 0.50

0.00 0.00 0.00 1.8

Therefore from the above table the GPH and SPH is coming to be around 1.00 and 1.8 respectively. Calculation of Toxicity Index: Toxicity Index

: Th + Ts (1+GPH+SPH) 100

Toxicity Index

: [250 + 125 (1 + 1.00 + 1.8)]/100

Toxicity Index

: 7.25

The Toxicity Index for sulphuric acid is calculated to be around 7.25 which indicate that the degree of hazard is moderate from table no. 7.23

4) Monds Index of Nonyl Phenol

General & Special Process Hazard 1.General

Process Base Factor Exothermic Chemical Reaction Endothermic Processes Material handling and transfer Enclosed or Indoor Process Units Access Drainage and Spill Control General Process Hazard Factor ( F1 )

1.00 0.30 to 1.25 0.20 to 0.40 0.25 to 1.05 0.25 to 0.90 0.20 to 0.35 0.25 to 0.50

1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00

2.Special

Process Base Factor Toxic material(s) Sub atmospheric pressure (< 500 mm Operation in or near flammable range

1.00 0.20 to 0.80 0.50 0.00 to 0.80

1.00 0.60 0.00

_____inerted ______noninerted 1. Tank farm storage flammable 0.50 2. Process upset or purge failure 0.30 Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

0.0 0.00 Chapter 7- 134

3. Always in Flammable range Dust Explosion Pressure Operating pressure

psig

0.80

0.00

0.25 to 2.00

0.00 0.00

Low temperature 0.20 to 0.30 0.00 Quantity of flammable / unstable 1. Liquids or gases in process 0.00 9 2. Liquids or gases in storage 1.1 51.13 x 10 3. Combustible Solids in Storage, Dust 0.00 in Process Corrosion & Erosion 0.10 to 0.75 0.10 Leakage - Joints & Packing 0.10 to 1.50 0.10 Use of Fired Equipment 0.00 Hot oil heat exchange system 0.15 to 1.15 0.00 Rotating Equipment 0.50 0.00 Special Process Hazard Factor ( F2 ) 2.9 Therefore from the above table the GPH and SPH is coming to be around 1.00 and 2.9 respectively. Calculation of Toxicity Index: Toxicity Index

: Th + Ts (1+GPH+SPH) 100

Toxicity Index

: [250 + 125 (1 + 1 + 2.9)]/100

Toxicity Index

: 8.625

The Toxicity Index for Nonyl Phenol is calculated to be around 8.625 which indicate that the degree of hazard is moderate from table no. 7.23

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

Chapter 7- 135